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ARTICLES
WHERE OIL IS KING
Kristen van de Biezenbos*
Donald Trump has won the 2016 presidential election, and, based on his
campaign rhetoric, it seems reasonable to anticipate that the next four
years will see a rollback of federal rules and regulations originally
intended to combat climate change and environmental pollution in favor of
increased production of fossil fuels, including coal. This raises the question
of where we can look for protection of environmental goals, if not to federal
law or agencies. Unconventional solutions to energy and environmental
issues may be the only way to move forward on environmental challenges in
the near term.
This Article suggests one such unconventional solution to the problems
presented by the use of hydraulic fracturing (“fracking”). In response to
the perceived environmental threats of fracking, many cities and towns have
sought to limit it through local bans, moratoria, and regulation. However,
in 2015, a number of states passed laws that forbid any city, town, or other
municipal body from banning fracking or passing certain regulations on the
practice. Further, the highest courts of several other states have ruled that
state law preempts local restrictions on fracking. In many cases, this
means that local governments must allow fracking, so the question arises as
to how these governments can address environmental concerns. This
Article is the first to propose that cities and towns where fracking is taking
place could incorporate and enforce existing state environmental laws. By
doing so, those municipalities may be able to minimize some of the
environmental harms associated with fracking. Further, this Article
explains why incorporation and enforcement of state-level environmental
laws by cities and towns should not be expressly or impliedly preempted.
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INTRODUCTION
There was a time when hydraulic fracturing, or “fracking,” was hailed by
the oil and gas industry and by environmentalists as a positive development
for the U.S. energy industry. Fracking, it was believed, provided a path
toward the sometimes at-odds goals of American energy independence and
lowered carbon emissions.1 From an industry perspective, fracking,
combined with horizontal drilling, opened up to exploration new and
previously unreachable oil and natural gas shale formations and oil sands.
It also boosted domestic production.2 Fracking not only made money for
companies that engaged in fracking, but it also provided a tremendous boost
to U.S. oil production, meaning that we could begin to satisfy our domestic
thirst for nonrenewables like oil and natural gas without having to import
oil from member states of the Organization of the Petroleum Exporting
Countries (OPEC), like Saudi Arabia.3 Early environmental supporters of
the technique pointed out that fracking produces an abundance of natural
gas, which produces less than half the carbon dioxide emissions of coal and
can thus be viewed as a transition fuel, helping to ease the move from fossil
fuels to renewable sources of energy.4
But the tides of public opinion have turned against fracking.5 No longer
seen as a possible solution, fracking has come under fire from
1. See, e.g., David B. Spence, The Political Economy of Local Vetoes, 93 TEX. L. REV.
351, 355–56 (2015) (noting that fracking has been endorsed by some environmental groups).
2. See id. at 354–55 (describing the ways in which fracking coupled with horizontal
drilling has caused a sea change in the domestic oil and natural gas industries); see also
David B. Spence, Federalism, Regulatory Lags, and the Political Economy of Energy
Production, 161 U. PA. L. REV. 431, 433–34 (2013).
3. See, e.g., Kenneth Artz, Fracking Leading to Economic Growth, Rapid Job Creation
in North Dakota, HEARTLAND INST. (Dec. 16, 2014), https://www.heartland.org/
news-opinion/news/fracking-leading-to-economic-growth-rapid-job-creation-in-north-dakota
[https://perma.cc/4D5L-8J7G]. OPEC includes oil exporting nations in the Middle East,
Africa, and South America. See Member Countries, ORG. PETROLEUM EXPORTING
COUNTRIES, http://www.opec.org/opec_web/en/about_us/25.htm (last visited Feb. 16, 2017)
[https://perma.cc/T4VH-F63M].
4. See Wes Deweese, Fracturing Misconceptions: A History of Effective State
Regulation, Groundwater Protection, and the Ill-Conceived FRAC Act, 6 OKLA. J.L. &
TECH., no. 49, 2010, at 1, 4–5; see also Hannah Wiseman, Regulatory Adaptation in
Fractured Appalachia, 21 VILL. ENVTL. L.J. 229, 231 (2010) (“The quintessential bridge fuel
in America may be natural gas, which is abundant and unit-per-unit releases relatively few
greenhouse gas emissions when burned, as compared to other traditional fuels such as
coal.”); Bjorn Lomborg, A Fracking Good Story, SLATE (Sept. 15, 2012), http://
www.slate.com/articles/health_and_science/project_syndicate/2012/09/thanks_to_fracking_
u_s_carbon_emissions_are_at_the_lowest_levels_in_20_years_.html [https://perma.cc/622
L-U6LE]; Aaron Task, Fracking: It’s Good for the Economy . . . AND the Environment,
YAHOO! FIN. (Dec. 12, 2012, 10:53 AM), http://finance.yahoo.com/blogs/dailyticker/fracking-good-economy-environment-155325507.html
[https://perma.cc/RYC2-UP
9T].
5. See, e.g., Robert Rapier, Fracking Has Been Around Since 1949, Why the Recent
Controversy?, GLOBAL ENERGY INITIATIVE, http://globalenergyinitiative.org/insights/58fracking-has-been-around-since-1949-why-the-recent-controversy.html (last visited Feb. 16,
2017) [https://perma.cc/788E-XGVS]. The controversy, at the most basic level, is between
adverse effects on human heath, wildlife, and the environment allegedly caused by fracking
versus its many economic benefits, especially for traditionally poorer rural areas. For

1634

FORDHAM LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 85

environmental groups and media outlets as the public has focused on the
possible threats fracking poses to human health and the environment,
particularly after the release of the film Gasland,6 which included dramatic
images of citizens living near fracking operations in Pennsylvania setting
their tap water on fire due to high methane content.7 Critics have also
pointed out that there is still much about the environmental impact of
fracking that is not known, especially with respect to the impact of waste
disposal, contamination of surface water, and earthquake activity near
fracking sites.8 Fracking has also garnered opposition from landowners
who do not want the sounds and disruptions that accompany fracking—not
contrasting positions on fracking, compare Fracking, FOOD & WATER WATCH, http://
www.foodandwaterwatch.org/problems/fracking (last visited Feb. 16, 2017) (claiming that
fracking is too dangerous because of health and environmental concerns and providing
multiple resources in support) [https://perma.cc/8DWJ-A2J5], with Pioneering America’s
Energy Future, ENERGY FROM SHALE, http://www.energyfromshale.org/americas-energy
(last visited Feb. 16, 2017) (purporting to explain why “fracking offers good news for
America”) [https://perma.cc/2CB6-66JH]. This Article does not take a position between
these two poles. It should also be noted that, according to a 2013 study by the University of
Texas, a majority of Americans who are familiar with fracking also support it. See Steve
Brooks, UT Energy Poll Shows Divide on Fracking, UT NEWS (Apr. 9, 2013), http://
news.utexas.edu/2013/04/09/ut-energy-poll-shows-divide-on-fracking (“Just over half of
consumers are still not familiar with hydraulic fracturing, commonly called ‘fracking.’ Of
those who are, 45 percent support it, while 41 percent oppose it. There’s a similar split over
fracking on public lands, with 41 percent wanting to promote the practice and 36 percent to
ban it.”) [https://perma.cc/PS5T-4N6M].
6. GASLAND (HBO Documentary Films 2010). This film provoked its own miniature
controversy as being too one sided and prompted the rebuttal film FrackNation, which
questions whether the tap water shown as being flammable in Gasland might be naturally
methane-infused water or “burning springs” that predate fracking. See FRACKNATION (Ann
and Phelim Media 2013). As an illustration of the complex politics swirling around fracking
globally, the director of FrackNation, who is Irish, claims that the International Monetary
Fund censored him when they refused to show a clip of his film during his appearance before
the group. Andrew Trotman, Fracking Filmmaker Accuses IMF of Censorship, DAILY
TELEGRAPH (Mar. 21, 2013), http://www.telegraph.co.uk/finance/newsbysector/energy/
9947124/Fracking-film-maker-accuses-IMF-of-censorship.html
[https://perma.cc/H79XM2SS]. According to the director, the IMF was bowing to pressure from Russia, which
allegedly sees fracking as a threat to the dominance of its state oil behemoth, Gazprom. Id.
7. The Huffington Post review of Gasland is an excellent encapsulation of the film’s
effect on the public perception of fracking. Stewart Nusbaumer, Big Sky Doc Film Fest:
Gasland Fuel for Justice, HUFFINGTON POST (Apr. 20, 2010, 5:12 AM), http://
www.huffingtonpost.com/stewart-nusbaumer/big-sky-doc-film-fest-emg_b_467605.html
[https://perma.cc/ZC3E-R3WZ]. After pointing out that the process was pioneered by
Halliburton, which was once headed by former Vice President Dick Cheney, the review
states:
Gasland addresses Is fracking safe? You want to guess? . . . We see water that
can be lit on fire right out of the faucet. We hear from chronically ill residents, all
with the same mysterious symptoms, that live next to drilling areas in disparate
locations. We feast our eyes on a slew of huge pools of toxic wastes and dead
animals—it’s an ugly, deadly mess.
Id.
8. There are over 400 local fracking bans in the United States alone. See Spence, supra
note 1, at 351–52. With respect to seismic activity, the scientific consensus is that fracking
is not causing earthquakes (at least, not any earthquakes of noticeable intensity) but that
wastewater
injection
wells
are.
See
Induced
Earthquakes,
USGS,
http://earthquake.usgs.gov/research/induced/myths.php (last visited Feb. 16, 2017) [https://
perma.cc/87J8-LJYN].

2017]

WHERE OIL IS KING

1635

to mention the “boomtown” explosion of road construction and the influx of
oil workers—to mar their neighborhoods.9 Even communities that once
welcomed fracking operations as an economic boon have struggled with the
associated costs, including building roads to allow large trucks to transport
well and drill parts and constructing storage facilities for fracking fluid and
proppant.10
In addition to the political and environmental controversies that surround
it, fracking is also of particular interest to energy scholars because of its
unique position in the fragmented world of U.S. energy regulation.11
Although most energy sources such as coal, hydropower, and nuclear power
are overseen by a collection of federal, state, and local actors, fracking is
subject to little federal oversight and inconsistent state regulation—and as
such, it is, in many ways, the Wild West of energy production, with the
only real limits being those imposed by communities and by states.12 Some
have also argued that, in states where the oil and gas industry is powerful
like Texas and Oklahoma the only ones actually regulating fracking are the
oil and gas industries themselves.13
Perhaps in part because fracking is not comprehensively regulated, a
compelling body of literature has developed on the issue of local authority
over fracking—specifically, whether and why local bans and restrictions on
fracking are positive developments.14 Thus far, the majority of scholars
have weighed in favor of power for local governments to ban or regulate
9. See, e.g., Dan Solomon, ExxonMobil CEO Doesn’t Want a Fracking Operation Near
His Backyard, TEX. MONTHLY (Feb. 25, 2014), http://www.texasmonthly.com/dailypost/exxonmobil-ceo-doesnt-want-fracking-operation-near-his-backyard [https://perma.cc/42
45-ZXYW]. Note that Denton did pass a fracking ban, which led the Texas legislature to
pass H.B. 40, one of the laws that spurred this Article. See H.B. 40, 84th Leg., Reg. Sess.
(Tex. 2015); see also Texas Stops Cities and Towns from Banning Fracking, BBC, (May 19,
2015), http://www.bbc.com/news/world-us-canada-32805973 [https://perma.cc/EW53-BM
A8].
10. See Spence, supra note 1, at 367–68.
11. See James W. Coleman, Importing Energy, Exporting Regulation, 83 FORDHAM L.
REV. 1357, 1358–59 (2014) (noting that the failure of the federal government to pass
comprehensive energy regulations has forced the states to take the lead); Hari M. Osofsky &
Hannah J. Wiseman, Dynamic Energy Federalism, 72 MD. L. REV. 773, 778 (2013)
(describing the regulatory picture of energy in the United States as fractured, noting
“patterns of inadequate regulatory authority; simultaneous overlap and fragmentation; and
entities in public regulatory roles enmeshed with, and at times partially made up of, the
private actors that they ostensibly regulate across numerous types of energy law”).
12. See, e.g., Tim McDonnell and James West, It’s the Wild F*ing West out There,
MOTHER JONES (Nov.–Dec. 2012), http://www.motherjones.com/environment/2012/11/
fracking-safety-north-dakota [https://perma.cc/6893-DGFM].
13. See David A. Dana & Hannah J. Wiseman, A Market Approach to Regulating the
Energy Revolution: Assurance Bonds, Insurance, and the Certain and Uncertain Risks of
Hydraulic Fracturing, 99 IOWA L. REV. 1523, 1555 (2014). Note that Professors Dana and
Wiseman refute this view, stating that the regulators they encountered were not simply
beholden to the oil and gas industry. See id. at 1555 n.130.
14. See, e.g., Spence, supra note 1, at 376–84; Hannah J. Wiseman, Governing Fracking
from the Ground Up, 93 TEX. L. REV. SEE ALSO 29, 34–36 (2015); see also Joshua P.
Fershee, How Local Is Local?: A Response to Professor David B. Spence’s The Political
Economy of Local Vetoes, 93 TEX. L. REV. SEE ALSO 61, 63–74 (2015) (looking more
specifically at the success of local bans in surviving legal challenges).
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fracking operations.15 Increasingly, however, states with significant
existing fracking operations are growing impatient with local bans and
restrictions on fracking, which is not surprising given the enormous
economic boost fracking can provide—both to localities in the short term
and to the state in the longer term.16 What is missing from the conversation
is what cities and towns may do to regulate or otherwise put limits on how
and where fracking takes place when they do not have the option of banning
fracking outright. This is an important question because fracking, perhaps
above all other extractive techniques, has serious impacts on local
communities.
However, there is a growing rift between state and local governments
over fracking. Leading what appears to be a burgeoning state movement to
prohibit local fracking bans altogether and curtail local regulations are
Texas, Oklahoma, and North Carolina. In early 2015, Texas and Oklahoma
passed House Bill 4017 (H.B. 40) and Senate Bill 80918 (S.B. 809),
respectively. North Carolina followed with Senate Bill 119 (S.B. 119) in
late September of 2015.19 All three laws claim that state regulation of oil
and gas preempts20 local laws and regulations and that municipal
governments may not enact stricter regulations on the industry than those
imposed by state law.21 H.B. 40 goes a step further in prohibiting cities and
towns from passing regulations that would prohibit fracking or make it
“commercially [un]reasonable.”22 Although supporters argue that these
laws are necessary to protect the rights of private property owners who are
deprived of the money that they might receive from fracking on their
property by local bans,23 the laws go much further. Additionally, recent
15. See supra note 14.
16. In Texas, for example, five of the state’s cities were among the top fifteen places in
the United States to recover from the 2008 recession, and, of those five, three—Midland,
Odessa, and Laredo—can attribute their success to fracking. See Julie Verhage, Here Are the
15 Cities That Have Done the Best (and the Worst) Since the Recession, BLOOMBERG (June
22, 2015), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2015-06-22/here-are-the-15-cities-thathave-done-the-best-and-the-worst-since-the-recession [https://perma.cc/7VEC-HGRR]. This
is true even though a decline in dry gas (including natural gas) prices has led to a slowdown
in fracking and other oil and gas operations associated with dry gas production, although
note there has not been a similar slowdown in oil and gas liquids (such as propane and
ethane) production. See id.
17. See H.B. 40, 84th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Tex. 2015).
18. See S.B. 809, 55th Leg., 1st Sess. (Okla. 2015). The Oklahoma law also gives the
state exclusive jurisdiction over wastewater wells, which have been found to be responsible
for increased seismic activity. Id.
19. See S.B. 119, Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (N.C. 2015).
20. As discussed more fully in Part I, H.B. 40 specifically reads that the State of Texas
has occupied the field of oil and gas regulation, even though Texas does not in fact
comprehensively regulate oil and gas. See David E. Pierce, Developing a Common Law of
Hydraulic Fracturing, 72 U. PITT. L. REV. 685, 691 (2011).
21. See N.C. S.B. 119; Okla. S.B. 809; Tex. H.B. 40.
22. Tex. H.B. 40. The Oklahoma law, on the other hand, does specifically reserve for
municipalities the power to use zoning, setback requirements, and other traditional local
regulations to protect the health and welfare of its citizens. See Okla. S.B. 809.
23. See Wade Goodwyn, New Texas Law Makes Fracking Bans Illegal, NPR (May 20,
2015),
http://www.npr.org/2015/05/20/408156948/new-texas-law-makes-local-frackingbans-illegal (including the comment made by Todd Staples, president of the Texas Oil and
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court decisions in Louisiana and Colorado striking down local moratoria on
fracking suggest that many cities and towns must live with the reality of
fracking within their communities.24
This Article acknowledges that there are benefits to state control that
justify the state as the first line in fracking regulation.25 In particular, statelevel regulation promotes intrastate consistency in the law, at least from the
perspective of compliance (although the lack of federal regulation means
there is no such consistency across the states, and it is arguable whether
allowing states to control oil and gas regulation has led to a race to the
bottom, where residents of states that depend heavily on the energy industry
bear more of the fracking burden).26 However, if a state assumes such
control, it places itself in the position of being the only governmental body
overseeing the oil and gas industry. This, in turn, places the burden on the
state to ensure that the industry addresses negative externalities imposed
upon the state, particularly with respect to potential harm to local air and
water quality. Because many states are not equipped to deal with the
environmental challenges posed by fracking at the city and town level, it
makes sense to give these municipal governments an expanded role in
addressing those challenges.
This Article argues that if states does not or cannot ensure compliance
with their environmental regulations, cities and towns may be able to do it
for them. Further, taking this route should not raise state preemption
concerns because the cities are not passing regulations that are inconsistent
with, or in excess of, state law. Indeed, states already do the same thing
when they pass laws to enforce federal regulation, a practice the U.S.
Supreme Court has permitted.27 Additionally, this Article addresses the
other important policy goals that would be furthered if local governments
were permitted to incorporate and enforce state environmental laws,

Gas Association, that “[i]f a city wants to stop an activity, you know, our Constitution
protects the rights of property owners. And they just need to pay them for that, but this [city
of Denton fracking] ban did not allow that”) [https://perma.cc/2ER4-CTTT].
24. See City of Fort Collins v. Colo. Oil & Gas Ass’n, 369 P.3d 586, 594 (Colo. 2016);
St. Tammany Parish v. Welsh, 199 So. 3d 3 (La. Ct. App. 2016).
25. As a practical matter, there is no “silver bullet” that would restore the ability of
municipalities in all states to ban fracking. Under preemption and federalism principles,
either the federal or state governments will have primary authority over the regulation of oil
and gas in a broad sense, and municipalities will not be able to enact conflicting laws or
regulations. It is the position of this Article that approaching the problem of what powers a
municipality does have with respect to oil and gas should be based on the current reality of
regulation of oil and gas by the states. Although several authors have made compelling
cases for federal control of oil, gas, and fracking in particular, there are several reasons why
this is not likely in the foreseeable future. These reasons are discussed in detail in Part II.
26. This author believes that loopholes in federal environmental laws that exempt
fracking should be closed, but, as discussed in Part I, the environmental problems that
fracking can cause are just one reason why the process is so controversial. The other reason
is the serious impact on the quality of life of residents located near fracking sites. This
Article argues that only local governments can adequately respond to such uniquely local
concerns.
27. See, e.g., Huron Portland Cement Co. v. City of Detroit, 362 U.S. 440 (1960).
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including retaining the benefits of the federalist system and increasing
citizen confidence in the democratic process.
Part I examines the uneven regulatory landscape of fracking, provides an
overview of the fracking process, and examines how the role of local
governments differs in two states: (1) Pennsylvania, which has an uneasy
mixture of state and local control, including state attempts to override local
bans, and (2) Texas, which did not enact a single city-wide ban on fracking
until late 2014, prompting the passage of H.B. 40 only months later.28 Part
II provides a historical overview of the state’s role in the evolution of oil
and gas regulations generally and provides a broad overview of the
uncertainty surrounding state-local power structures, as well as when and
how the doctrine of preemption has been used by states to strike down local
ordinances. Part III argues that local governments—particularly those in
states that have banned local regulation of the oil and gas industry—should
incorporate and enforce state environmental regulations. Doing so avoids
preemption issues and furthers important policy goals.
I. THE FEDERALISM DEBATE:
WHO SHOULD REGULATE FRACKING?
The regulation of energy sources in the United States is complex, with
different local, state, and federal agencies governing different aspects of
energy extraction, production, pricing, and consumption. To make matters
even more complicated, the makeup of regulatory actors also changes
depending on the energy source.29 With respect to oil and gas, regulation
has traditionally been a state matter, but the reality is more complex.30 The
various actors taking part in the regulation of oil and gas today can be
likened to the layers of an onion: at the federal layer, there are regulations
for the control of emissions and the protection of wildlife and the
environment;31 at the state layer, approval of applications to frack or drill
are made; at the local layer, cities and towns regulate by way of zoning and
setback requirements, which allows them to exercise some control over
where and how the drilling takes place.32 Some states have clashed with
local governments over the latter’s regulations and have argued that state
laws preempt local regulations, either expressly or by occupying the field.33
28. See Aleem Maqbool, The Texas Town That Banned Fracking (and Lost), BBC (June
16, 2015), http://www.bbc.com/news/world-us-canada-33140732 [https://perma.cc/TN64-S
A7Y].
29. See Osofsky & Wiseman, supra note 11, at 778–79.
30. See Spence, supra note 1, at 369–70 (noting that “[r]egulation of onshore oil and gas
production has traditionally been a state matter, and producing states have statutes in place to
regulate oil and gas production,” but noting that federal regulation and local bans on fracking
are also in play).
31. See Osofsky & Wiseman, supra note 11, at 778. Although, as discussed below in
Part I, fracking is not subject to federal environmental laws.
32. See Hannah J. Wiseman, Coordinating the Oil and Gas Commons, 2014 BYU L.
REV. 1543, 1547–53.
33. See id. Even states that allow local zoning ordinances require state-level permitting
to proceed with drilling operations. See Hannah J. Wiseman, The Capacity of States to
Govern Shale Gas Development Risks, 48 ENVTL. SCI. & TECH. 8376, 8379–81 (2014). On
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While these layers might suggest that regulation of fracking is
comprehensive, that is not the case. Regulatory dynamics between states
and local governments vary, and, as Professors Hari Osofsky and Hannah
Wiseman have pointed out, there are serious gaps in the regulation of oil
and gas extraction, including drilling, that have yet to be adequately
addressed by any regulatory body.34 Further, some existing federal
regulations, including the Safe Drinking Water Act, do not cover fracking,
which raises the question of whether the Environmental Protection Agency
(EPA) should take steps to more comprehensively address fracking or
whether state environmental agencies can adequately address those gaps.35
Despite the proliferation of fracking wells in recent years, no clear
answer on who should regulate each part of the process has developed. To
some extent, this may be a product of our national failure to decide where
our priorities should lie—i.e., whether economics trumps environment or
vice versa. Indeed, it has been observed that opinions on whether federal or
state governments should assume control of fracking may be politically
motivated.36 As Professor Michael Burger stated, “Those who envision
private profit and the expansion of American power tend to favor state
regulation. Those who fear environmental and public health risks, along
with the perpetuation of the fossil fuel economy, tend to favor federal
regulation.”37 While this may be an oversimplification, there is no question
that the regulation of fracking is a politically charged issue. And, as noted
above, there is recent literature that advocates for local regulation (usually
in the form of vetoes or bans) of fracking over both state and federal
control.38
To better understand how local and state regulations of fracking interact,
it is useful to understand what fracking is and how varied the dynamics
between state and local regulations are from state to state. The following
part will address both of these issues and will also compare the results of
the federal front, fracking has raised concerns about impacts on threatened species.
Interestingly, it is not always the fracking process itself that causes the greatest
environmental impact; just as potentially destructive is the construction of access roads to
the drilling pad and waste disposal areas. See Kalyani Robbins, Awakening the Slumbering
Giant: How Horizontal Drilling Technology Brought the Endangered Species Act to Bear
on Hydraulic Fracturing, 63 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 1143, 1152–64 (2013).
34. See Osofsky & Wiseman, supra note 11, at 778.
35. Many scholars have argued for greater federal regulation of fracking, particularly by
including it in relevant environmental statutes. See, e.g., Michael Burger, Fracking and
Federalism Choice, 161 U. PA. L. REV. ONLINE 150, 159–63 (2013); Angela C. Cupas, The
Not-So-Safe Drinking Water Act: Why We Must Regulate Hydraulic Fracturing at the
Federal Level, 33 WM. & MARY ENVTL. L. & POL’Y REV. 605, 606–09 (2009); Hannah
Wiseman, Untested Waters: The Rise of Hydraulic Fracturing in Oil and Gas Production
and the Need to Revisit Regulation, 20 FORDHAM ENVTL. L. REV. 115, 182–87 (2009)
(arguing that the federal government should regulate fracking under the Safe Drinking Water
Act).
36. See Michael Burger, The (Re)federalization of Fracking Regulation, 2013 MICH. ST.
L. REV. 1483, 1486. Burger himself suggests a hybrid federal-state regulatory model. See id.
at 1486–87.
37. Id. at 1486.
38. See supra note 14.
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two states’ moves to preempt local regulation of fracking: Pennsylvania,
where a state challenge to local bans failed, and Texas, a state that has
recently passed legislation intended to preempt local bans and regulations.
A. Fracking: An Old Technology with a New Twist
Fracking itself is not a new technology.39 The process was first used in
1947 in Kansas and quickly became widespread—according to the
Geological Society of America, there are over a million wells throughout
the country that were drilled using fracking and traditional vertical drilling,
meaning that the drill is pointed downward during the entire process of
drilling the well.40 Although there are several fracking methods, all have
certain features in common. During fracking, as the well is being drilled,
millions of gallons of water mixed with an assortment of chemicals and
sand or ceramic beads called “proppant”41 are injected into the ground to
fracture or expand fractures in the shale and reach the impacted oil and
gas—this cocktail of water, chemicals, and proppant is known as “fracking
fluid.”42 The fracking fluid can vary in consistency from water to gel, and
may contain chemicals ranging from methanol acid to diesel fuel (although
some companies have informally agreed not to use the latter).43 Companies
are not required by federal law to reveal the chemical makeup of the
fracking fluid they use (although many states do require such disclosures),
which may contribute to some local resistance to the process.44
Fracking can be thought of as using the highly pressurized water to make
cracks in the shale or tight sands in a similar fashion as a rock hitting a
windshield. Once the cracks have opened, the fracking fluid flows into
those cracks to hold them open.45 Then, when the water is removed from
the well, the change in pressure causes the oil and any associated natural
gas to flow from the cracks up the wellbore, or the channel made by the
drill.46 When this process was eventually combined with horizontal
drilling, a boom was born—vast resources of oil and natural gas that were
39. See Just the Facts, ENERGY DEPTH, https://energyindepth.org/just-the-facts/ (last
visited Feb. 16, 2017) [https://perma.cc/4Z9K-T9LF].
40. Id.
41. The chemicals used in fracking water have evolved over time, especially in the
1980s and 1990s, with an emphasis on “operational efficiency rather than . . . potential
environmental or human health impacts.” U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, EPA 816-R-04-003,
EVALUATION OF IMPACTS TO UNDERGROUND SOURCES OF DRINKING WATER BY HYDRAULIC
FRACTURING OF COALBED METHANE RESERVOIRS 4-1 (2004). The impact of water-based
fracturing drilling fluid storage and waste is discussed in more depth in Part II.
42. See id.
43. See Wiseman, supra note 35 at 118–19 (offering a more comprehensive overview of
the technical aspects of fracking, including the concerns over chemicals used in fracking
fluid).
44. See Cupas, supra note 35, at 605–07. The EPA did promulgate a notice of proposed
rulemaking to consider whether fracking fluid should be regulated under the Toxic
Substances Control Act, but a final rule has not been released. See Natural Gas Extraction—
Hydraulic Fracturing, EPA, https://www.epa.gov/hydraulicfracturing (last visited Feb. 16,
2017) [https://perma.cc/2ZNE-JRNE].
45. See Wiseman, supra note 35, at 120.
46. See id.
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previously unreachable because of the low permeability of shale and tight
sands suddenly became accessible.47 It should be noted, however, that
fracking is used to access oil and gas in shale formations; once that access
has been created, the well becomes conventional. In other words, fracking
is not the entire life of a well, only its birth. Once a well has been fracked,
pulling the oil and gas out is done in the same manner as any other type of
well.
Despite the fact that fracking is only one stage of extracting oil and gas
from a shale play, it is not a small or isolated process. Even compared to
conventional drilling operations, it is an expensive, loud, and disruptive
activity that increasingly takes place near residential areas.48 As discussed
above, while there are significant gaps in fracking regulation on a national
scale, state governments do regulate many aspects of the process, from
granting permits to minimizing air pollution to the cleanup and disposal of
wastewater.49
While some states delegate many of these functions to oil and gas or
railroad commissions, other states have moved those duties to state
environmental agencies.50 The traditional emphasis for most state oil and
gas laws has been promoting the industry and making the acquisition of
mineral rights more efficient, but local concerns over health and the
environment have prompted some states to pass fracking-specific
regulations.51 And there are certainly many communities that have
welcomed fracking and the economic effects it brings, especially in rural,
economically depressed areas.52 However, other communities and larger,
denser cities have not been so welcoming.
B. State and Local Conflicts in Fracking Regulation
One of the major reasons why fracking has become such a political flash
point is because of the enormous impact that fracking operations have on
nearby communities and the fear of drinking water contamination by
fracking fluid. Even more than many conventional oil wells53 and some
47.
48.
49.
50.
51.
52.

See id. at 120–23.
See id. at 123–28.
See Osofsky & Wiseman, supra note 11, at 777–79.
See Spence, supra note 1, at 368–69.
See id. at 368–71.
See id.; see also DANIEL RAIMI & RICHARD NEWELL, DUKE UNIV. ENERGY
INITIATIVE, SHALE PUBLIC FINANCE: LOCAL GOVERNMENT REVENUES AND COSTS
ASSOCIATED WITH OIL AND GAS DEVELOPMENT (2014) (studying the costs and benefits of the
fracking boom and concluding that “the net impact of recent oil and gas development has
generally been positive for local public finances,” except for some areas in the Bakken
Shale); Wiseman, supra note 35, at 121–27.
53. It is true that some enhanced oil recovery techniques used in conventional oil and
gas recovery can be much more complex undertakings than a traditional oil drilling platform
or pump jack, but one aspect of fracking that sets it apart from other well stimulation
techniques is the need for millions of gallons of water, which must be stored, transported,
and disposed of. See Wiseman, supra note 35 at 118–19, Enhanced Oil Recovery,
ENERGY.GOV, https://www.energy.gov/fe/science-innovation/oil-gas-research/enhanced-oilrecovery (last visited Feb. 16, 2017) [https://perma.cc/3YNU-SXPN].
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types of enhanced oil recovery methods, fracking is a major undertaking
that involves heavy truck traffic, very loud noises (both while the well pad
is being constructed and during the fracking process itself), the installation
of infrastructure to process and transport natural gas, scores of new workers
who need housing and services, and millions of gallons of water that must
be transported, stored, and disposed of.54 Even if it were possible to make
the direct environmental threats of fracking—including the possibility of
drinking water contamination and the release of carbon dioxide and
methane—vanish overnight, fracking would still be controversial because
of the incidental environmental effects that light, noise, and truck exhaust
can have on the quality of life of residents who live, work, and go to school
near well sites.55
It is presently impossible to make the direct environmental effects of
fracking vanish or, indeed, to address them comprehensively. This is both
because approaches to regulating the environmental effects of fracking vary
widely from state to state and because, even when a state does have strong
environmental laws, those laws are not always enforced.56 This Article
specifically addresses the problems faced by cities and towns within states
that forbid local fracking bans and do not effectively enforce existing
environmental protections.
In some ways, there are two Americas when it comes to fracking: the
America that forbids fracking altogether or permits local bans on the
practice, which includes states like New York, Vermont, Maryland,
California, and Pennsylvania, and the America that welcomes fracking,
which includes states like Texas, Oklahoma, Louisiana, North Carolina,
Ohio, and Colorado, where state law limits what cities and towns may do to
regulate fracking operations.57 In the latter America, legal challenges to
local bans or ordinances citing federalism tend to come out in the state’s
54. For a vivid description of how a town (here Dimock, Pennsylvania) can be affected
by fracking, see Christopher Bateman, A Colossal Fracking Mess, VANITY FAIR (June 2010),
http://www.vanityfair.com/news/2010/06/fracking-in-pennsylvania-201006
[https://perma.cc/U296-G9S6].
You don’t need to drive around Dimock long to notice how the rolling hills and
farmland of this Appalachian town are scarred by barren, square-shaped clearings,
jagged, newly constructed roads with 18-wheelers driving up and down them, and
colorful freight containers labeled “residual waste.” Although there is a
moratorium on drilling new wells for the time being, you can still see the
occasional active drill site, manned by figures in hazmat suits and surrounded by
klieg lights, trailers, and pits of toxic wastewater, the derricks towering over barns,
horses, and cows in their shadows.
Id.
55. In this way, objections to fracking are similar to those concerning mountaintop
removal mining. See infra Part II.
56. For an excellent overview on how states vary in their regulatory approaches to oil
and gas and seem to rarely engage in sharing information on the efficacy of these approaches
with one another, see Hannah J. Wiseman, Regulatory Islands, 89 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1661,
1679–86 (2014).
57. See Spence, supra note 1, at 371–73. Note that the bans in Vermont and Maryland
seem to be largely symbolic, since there are no significant shale formations in either state
that would attract fracking activities. See Shannon M. Roesler, Federalism and Local
Environmental Regulation, 48 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1111, 1166–67 (2015).
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favor, thanks to extensive state regulations and an economy that is
dependent, to some extent, on oil and gas.58
As Professor David B. Spence has pointed out, several states, including
Louisiana and Colorado, have seen local bans fail to gain traction due to
strong state laws that preempt the field of oil and gas, including local vetoes
on extraction processes.59 When state oil and gas laws expressly preempt
or occupy the field—that is, regulate oil and gas so comprehensively that
there is nothing left for local governments to govern—local regulation or
bans on fracking may not be possible or even desired.60
What is different about laws like H.B. 40, S.B. 809, S.B. 119, and
proposed laws in Indiana,61 New Mexico,62 Kansas,63 Florida,64 and
Colorado65 is that they represent what appears to be a concerted effort by
states to expressly prohibit bans on fracking, even if such bans are what
local residents desire. Also, as discussed in more detail below, some of
these laws seek to prohibit certain types of regulations that are traditionally
within the power of local governments, especially home rule cities, when
they adversely impact fracking and other extractive techniques.66 The
solution proposed in this Article, however, does not require state control
over oil and gas—rather, it provides a way for any locality to assert more
environmental oversight where fracking is taking place. To illuminate the
difference in state regulations over local control of oil and gas, it is useful to
look at two states, Pennsylvania and Texas, where such regulations had
very different results.
C. The Regulatory Landscape of Fracking: Pennsylvania
Pennsylvania has a long relationship with the energy industry. That
legacy began with the 1775 discovery of anthracite coal in the northeastern
part of the state (which would later come to be known, appropriately, as
“the Coal Region”).67 By 1860, commercial mines in the Coal Region were
producing and shipping coal all over the country.68 By the dawn of the

58. See Spence, supra note 1, at 371–73.
59. See id. (detailing the various types of preemption—express, field, and conflict—that
have been used to strike down local bans and some regulations of fracking); see also City of
Fort Collins v. Colo. Oil & Gas Ass’n, 369 P.3d 586, 594 (Colo. 2016); St. Tammany Parish
v. Welsh, 199 So. 3d 3 (La. Ct. App. 2016).
60. See Spence, supra note 1; see also Wiseman, supra note 35, at 157–68.
61. See H.B. 1299, 118th Gen. Assemb., 2d Reg. Sess. (Ind. 2014).
62. See S.B. 421, 52d Leg., 1st Sess. (N.M. 2015).
63. See S.B. 245, 2013 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Kan. 2013).
64. See H.B. 1205, 2015 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Fla. 2015).
65. See H.B. 1119, 70th Gen. Assemb., 1st Reg. Sess. (Colo. 2015).
66. As discussed in more detail in Part II, when a state constitution designates cities over
a certain population as being home rule cities, the only limits placed on what those cities
may do with respect to local regulation are where the state has specifically stated that the
cities may not regulate. See generally Uma Outka, Intrastate Preemption in the Shifting
Energy Sector, 86 U. COLO. L. REV. 927 (2015) (providing an in-depth analysis of state and
local power sharing with respect to renewable energy development).
67. JOHN STUART RICHARDS, EARLY COAL MINING IN THE ANTHRACITE REGION 7 (2002).
68. See id.
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twentieth century, the state’s population had exploded, especially in the
northeast, and “area mines were producing fully 57 million tons of
anthracite coal annually.”69
But a mere two decades later, the economic boom provided by the Coal
Region was fading. Anthracite, an extremely high carbon form of coal that
is difficult to ignite and is much more expensive than lower-carbon bitumen
or lignite coal, began to decline in popularity at the beginning of the
twentieth century.70 While anthracite was suitable for heating small
residential spaces, the demand was now for very high quantities of cheaper,
lower-carbon coal to provide larger-scale steam-electric power
generation.71
Additionally, all types of coal now faced serious competition from oil
and gas, which were increasingly replacing coal as the fuel of industrial
engines because they were easier to transport. The advantage of oil was
particularly dramatic with respect to ships and locomotives, which had for
decades required men to shovel the coal into boilers.72 The decline of the
Coal Region, coupled with the steel crisis of the 1970s and the larger
national trend of a shrinking manufacturing sector, put large parts of
Pennsylvania in bleak economic circumstances through much of the rest of
the century.73
Although the predominance of coal as the energy source of choice during
the Industrial Revolution made the Coal Region an economic powerhouse
during the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, Pennsylvania is also the
birthplace of oil and gas drilling. Prior to the 1850s, petroleum had been
harvested in Pennsylvania from oil seeps, or surface oil, by dragging cloth
through the substance and then wringing it out.74 But then, a Pennsylvania
entrepreneur named Samuel Kier began keeping the petroleum that welled
up during the drilling of his salt mines and experimenting with possible
uses of the substance.75
Kier subsequently founded the first oil refinery in 1859 to convert
petroleum to kerosene for use in lamps. Around the same time, George

69. THOMAS DUBLIN & WATER LICHT, THE FACE OF DECLINE: THE PENNSYLVANIA
ANTHRACITE REGION IN THE TWENTIETH CENTURY 1–3 (2005).
70. Id.
71. Id. at 3. To get an idea of how much coal was needed during the Industrial Age, the
RMS Titanic had three engines powered by twenty-nine boilers that required over 600 tons
of coal a day. See ANTON GILL, TITANIC: THE REAL STORY OF THE CONSTRUCTION OF THE
WORLD’S MOST FAMOUS SHIP 147–48 (2012). That coal, in turn, had to be shoveled
continuously by hand around the clock into the boilers. See id. When she sank, the Titanic
had over eight thousand tons of coal in her holds. See id.
72. See DUBLIN & LICHT, supra note 69, at 3; see also DANIEL YERGIN, THE PRIZE: THE
EPIC QUEST FOR OIL, MONEY, AND POWER, at xiv-xv (1990) (detailing Winston Churchill’s
decision to switch the vessels of the British Navy from coal power to oil in part because of
the manpower required to shovel coal).
73. See DUBLIN & LICHT, supra note 69, at 3–4; see also STEVEN C. HIGH, INDUSTRIAL
SUNSET: THE MAKING OF NORTH AMERICA’S RUST BELT, 1969–1984 (2003).
74. See YERGIN, supra note 72, at 9.
75. HILDEGARDE DOLSON, THE GREAT OILDORADO: THE GAUDY AND TURBULENT YEARS
OF THE FIRST OIL RUSH: PENNSYLVANIA, 1859–1880, at 80 (1959).
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Bissell founded the Pennsylvania Rock Oil Company and, inspired by
Kier’s capture of oil by drilling for salt, began drilling for just the oil in the
western part of the state.76 Bissell struck oil using the drilling method in
1859, and the nation’s first oil rush was ignited.77 By 1891, Pennsylvania
“produced 31 million barrels of oil, 58 percent of the nation’s oil that
year.”78 But other states soon began to surpass Pennsylvania in terms of oil
output, and by 1907, the boom was over and production in the state had
stabilized.79
Pennsylvania is also one of the birthplaces of the modern fracking boom.
After the combination of the technique with horizontal drilling was
perfected in Texas’s Barnett Shale, it was quickly exported to the largest
shale play in the United States, the Marcellus Shale in Pennsylvania.80
Following the oil crisis of the 1970s, the U.S. Department of the Interior
funded research into mapping shale plays across the country that held vast
reservoirs of oil and gas that could not be reached using conventional
drilling methods.81 One of the larger shale formations identified by
geologists was the enormous Marcellus Shale, which stretches over 95,000
square miles from Virginia to New York along the Appalachian Basin (the
Marcellus’s sheer size and location is behind its nickname, the “Beast in the
East”).82
Fracking yielded dramatic results in the region in a very short time. The
first well in Pennsylvania (and the Marcellus) using horizontal drilling and
fracking was sunk in 2003. By the end of 2011, hundreds of millions of
cubic feet of natural gas were being produced by fracking from the
Marcellus Shale, and at least fifteen major interstate pipelines were in
various stages of approval by the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission
(FERC).83 But the economic benefits that initially thrilled Pennsylvanians
began to dim in the face of some of the negative local impacts of fracking,
including increased truck traffic, a lack of affordable housing when oil
industry employees snapped up rentals, and the strain put on local services
by a rapidly growing population.84 Environmental concerns over the effect
76. See id.
77. See id.
78. See id.
79. See id. at 87.
80. Hannah Wiseman, Regulatory Adaptation in Fractured Appalachia, 21 VILL. ENVTL.
L.J. 229, 231–34 (2010).
81. John A. Harper, The Marcellus Shale—An Old “New” Gas Reservoir in
Pennsylvania, 38 PA. GEOLOGY, Spring 2008, at 2, 3–5; Ross H. Pifer, What a Short, Strange
Trip It’s Been: Moving Forward After Five Years of Marcellus Shale Development, 72
U. PITT. L. REV. 615, 621 (2011); see also DAVID A. WAPLES, THE NATURAL GAS INDUSTRY
IN APPALACHIA: A HISTORY FROM THE FIRST DISCOVERY TO THE TAPPING OF THE MARCELLUS
SHALE 280 (2012).
82. WAPLES, supra note 81, at 80.
83. Id.; see also Pifer, supra note 81, at 621 (“Following the drilling of the Renz #1 well,
the number of Marcellus wells drilled in Pennsylvania each year began to increase at an
exponential rate—two wells were drilled in 2005, eleven in 2006, thirty-four in 2007, 210 in
2008, 768 in 2009, and 1,454 in 2010. Thus, by the end of 2010, a total of approximately
2,500 Marcellus wells had been drilled in Pennsylvania.”).
84. Pifer, supra note 81, at 625.
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of fracking on drinking water and air quality also began to grow,
particularly after the 2009 release of the documentary Gasland.85
Local regulations and bans on fracking began to gain popularity, and
state officials responded in 2012 by enacting an amendment to the
Pennsylvania Oil and Gas Act, known as “Act 13.”86 One of the provisions
of Act 13 was chapter 33, which “prohibit[ed] any local regulation of oil
and gas operations, including via environmental legislation, and require[d]
statewide uniformity among local zoning ordinances with respect to the
development of oil and gas resources.”87 This provision of Act 13 was to
go into effect sixty days after the legislation was passed.88 Between the
time Act 13 was passed and the date it was to go into effect, a group of
plaintiffs, including several counties, boroughs, and townships, filed suit in
Robinson Township v. Pennsylvania.89 The plaintiffs argued that Act 13
violated several provisions of the state constitution, including due process
and article 1, section 10 on the “inherent rights of mankind.”90 The lower
court agreed that the provision was unconstitutional.91
The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania agreed with the lower court that
certain provisions of Act 13, including chapter 33, violated state citizens’
right to due process because it required the changing of local zoning laws
“without regard for basic zoning principles and, thereby, failing to protect
interests of property owners from harm and altering the character of
neighborhoods.”92 The court noted with approval the lower court’s
observation that “local government . . . relies on public input to produce a
rational plan of development.”93 The court continued, “Act 13 requires
municipalities to act affirmatively to allow incompatible uses [in residential
neighborhoods] such as ‘drilling operations and impoundments, gas
compressor stations, storage and use of explosives’ in all zoning
districts.”94
The court rejected Pennsylvania’s contention that the sudden change in
local zoning laws was reasonably related to its police power, citing the
lower court’s finding that the purpose of Act 13’s usurpation of local
zoning power could only be justified “if compliant with the comprehensive
plan of the community.”95 Because Act 13 was not compliant, it was not
reasonably related to the state’s police power.96 Thus, the state supreme
85. See generally Ion Bogdan Vasi et al., “No Fracking Way!” Documentary Film,
Discursive Opportunity, and Local Opposition Against Hydraulic Fracturing in the United
States, 2010 to 2013, 80 AM. SOC. REV. 934 (2015) (arguing that the film Gasland helped to
create the antifracking movement worldwide).
86. See Robinson Township v. Pennsylvania, 83 A.3d 901, 915 (Pa. 2013).
87. Id.
88. Id.
89. 83 A.3d 901 (Pa. 2013).
90. Id. at 915.
91. Id. at 916.
92. Id. at 931.
93. Id.
94. Id.
95. Id. at 932.
96. Id.
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court struck down those provisions of Act 13 that would have prevented
local bans on fracking.97
However, this result has not deterred other states from passing laws
similar to Act 13.98 This is probably because, as illustrated in Texas, other
states do not have similar environmental guarantees in their constitutions
that would defeat such laws. This may not stop due process challenges
where the state uses a law like H.B. 40 to subvert local zoning and planning
authority whenever that authority conflicts with proposed drilling sites.
Indeed, the Texas state legislature seems to have drafted H.B. 40 with very
little concern for the possibility of it being struck down on any
environmental grounds, whether those grounds are constitutional, as in
Robinson Township, or rooted in some other legal principle, such as the
public trust doctrine.99
D. The Regulatory Landscape of Fracking: Texas
Like Pennsylvania, Texas has a long history with the energy industry, but
most of it has been with oil and gas. The first Texas oil rush occurred in
Spindletop, just outside of Beaumont, in 1902. At that time, Texas
observed the “pure” common law rule of capture when it came to oil and
gas, meaning that the owner of the oil was the person who pulled it out of
the ground, regardless of where the oil originated.100 This incentivized
drilling as many wells as possible on land that drillers owned or to which
they leased the mineral rights in an attempt to suck up as much oil from
underground as they could.101 The result was a dramatic depletion of the
Spindletop reservoir within a few years and massive amounts of waste
resulting from spills and well blowouts.102
A few years later, in 1919, the state forbade waste of oil and natural gas
and delegated the authority of creating and enforcing comprehensive oil and
gas regulations to an agency it had created a few decades prior, the Texas

97. See id.
98. See, e.g., S.B. 119, Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (N.C. 2015); S.B. 809, 55th Leg., 1st
Sess. (Okla. 2015); H.B. 40, 84th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Tex. 2015).
99. The public trust doctrine is a common law doctrine under which the state is treated
as holding lands under navigable waters in trust for its citizens, such that it cannot undertake
any projects that would destroy access to those submerged lands. In the past few decades,
the doctrine has been expanded in some states to encompass not just land under navigable
waters but clean air, water, and land in general. See Alexandra B. Klass, Fracking and the
Public Trust Doctrine: A Response to Spence, 93 TEX. L. REV. SEE ALSO 47, 49–51 (2015).
100. See Bruce M. Kramer & Owen L. Anderson, The Rule of Capture—An Oil and Gas
Perspective, 35 ENVTL. L. 899, 900–12 (2005). This is the law referred to in the famous “I
drink your milkshake” scene in the film There Will Be Blood.
101. The Spindletop Oil Boom has been described as a “feeding frenzy of human sharks.”
See Mary G. Ramos, Oil and Texas: A Cultural History, TEX. ALMANAC, http://
texasalmanac.com/topics/business/oil-and-texas-cultural-history (last visited Feb. 16, 2017)
[https://perma.cc/5MBQ-6YYC].
102. See DAVID F. PRINDLE, PETROLEUM POLITICS AND THE TEXAS RAILROAD COMMISSION
24 (2011). One massive blowout, the Lucas gusher, released up to 10,000 gallons of crude
oil a day for nine days until it was capped. See Ramos, supra note 101.
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Railroad Commission (“the Commission”).103 The Commission created
rules governing the manner of drilling, well spacing, waste disposal and
handling, and separation of oil and associated natural gas, as well as
requirements for record keeping by drilling companies.104 In 1934, the
Commission’s jurisdiction was extended to petroleum and petroleum
byproducts.105
The power held by the Commission over Texas oil and gas operations
cannot be overstated. In fact, the Commission’s comprehensive control
over oil and gas in Texas and its price-setting cooperation with other state
oil and gas agencies under the Interstate Oil and Compact Commission led
the magazine Scientific American to refer to the agency as the “world’s first
oil cartel.”106 Anyone who believes that an energy company has violated
the Commission’s rules, whether they are a private property owner or
municipality, must present their case before the Commission. If the
Commission believes a violation has taken place, it will assess the
appropriate fine and direct the offending drilling company to correct the
violation.107 If, however, it determines there is no violation, no report of
agency action is made.108 In this way, the Commission makes it difficult to
tell how many complaints are made against oil and gas companies in Texas
because records exist only where a violation was found.109
Thus, Texas comprehensively regulates oil and gas at the state level, but
that does not mean that cities have no role. Municipalities in Texas have
historically enjoyed the right to regulate oil and gas activity as long as they
do so in a way that is consistent with regulations promulgated by the
Commission.110 The principle is that “municipalities in Texas have, under
the police power, authority to regulate the drilling for and production of oil
and gas within their corporate limits, when acting for the protection of their
citizens and the property within their limits, looking to the preservation of
good government, peace, and order therein.”111
103. See James R. Norvell, The Railroad Commission of Texas; Its Origin and Relation to
the Oil and Gas Industry, 40 TEX. L. REV. 230, 239 (1961).
104. For more information about the authority to make rules, see id. at 240.
105. See History of the Railroad Commission 1866–1939, RAILROAD COMMISSION TEX.,
http://www.rrc.state.tx.us/about-us/history/history-1866-1939 (last visited Feb. 16, 2017)
[https://perma.cc/7LWM-H9EC].
106. Melissa C. Lott, The World’s First Oil Cartel Deep in the Heart of Texas, SCI. AM.
(Jan. 10, 2012), http://blogs.scientificamerican.com/plugged-in/worlds-first-oil-cartel-deepin-the-heart-of-texas [https://perma.cc/7NMB-ESM4].
107. See 16 TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 1.01–3.107 (2015); see also Hannah J. Wiseman, Risk
and Response in Fracturing Policy, 84 U. COLO. L. REV. 729, 747 (2013).
108. See Wiseman, supra note 107, at 749.
109. See supra note 107. In a testament to the Commission’s power, it also has long held
the power to fine or imprison witnesses it finds in contempt of its orders. See Whitney R.
Harris, The Administrative Law of Texas, 29 TEX. L. REV. 213, 221–22 (1950).
110. See Unger v. State, 629 S.W.2d 811, 812 (Tex. App. 1982). In this case, the Texas
Court of Appeals in Fort Worth upheld the power of a city to both regulate and prohibit the
drilling of oil within its borders without proper city permits. See id. This case is also cited
by the First District Court of Appeals of Texas in City of Houston v. BCCA Appeal Group,
485 S.W.3d 444 (Tex. App. 2013).
111. See Unger, 629 S.W.2d at 812.
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One frequently cited example of successful local regulation of oil and gas
is Fort Worth, located on the oil-and-gas-rich Barnett Shale play. Fort
Worth, which has a population of nearly one million,112 formed a city
commission in 2006 to make recommendations for the regulation of
fracking.113 The result was a city ordinance that regulates, among other
things, “noise levels, drilling of fresh water wells, compressor stations,
landscaping and screening, drilling within a floodplain, saltwater disposal,
measures for controlling water quality, road repairs, and . . . the allowable
distance from existing structures that wells may be drilled.”114 The city
also regulates the permitting of gas wells and requires the use of a closed
loop mud system that keeps waste inside the wellbore during the drilling
process.115 Further, while drilling may take place any time at urban well
sites, the actual fracking process may only be performed during daylight
hours and not at all on Sundays.116 Finally, the ordinance also includes
mechanisms to enforce these requirements.117
Fort Worth regulated fracking in this way without state interference for
eight years, but then, in late 2014, something changed. Less than an hour
from Fort Worth is Denton, Texas, an affluent suburb of Dallas. Like Fort
Worth, Denton is located in the Barnett Shale play.118 In 2014, Denton
made international headlines as the first Texas city to campaign seriously
for a ban on fracking within city limits.119 Denton was actually the first
city in Texas to pass fracking regulations of any kind,120 but over time the
city became frustrated by the number of oil and gas wells that were
“grandfathered” under the old state law regime and thus were exempt from
the city’s new regulations.121 In many cases, although these grandfathered
wells were originally drilled in more remote areas, development and growth
resulted in the wells being closer to buildings and residences than city
ordinances allowed.122 Consequently, these wells could be fracked even if
they violated Denton’s setback, zoning, or other local ordinances.123
Reportedly frustrated by the problem of grandfathered wells and the fear
that they would lead to fracking in the city’s heart, a group of Denton
112. Fort Worth, Texas, WIKIPEDIA, https://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?title=Fort_
Worth,_Texas&oldid=763502751 (last visited Feb. 16, 2017) [https://perma.cc/B2NCXGGZ]. The Dallas-Fort Worth metro area is home to almost seven million people. Id.
113. Brian J. Smith, Fracing the Environment?: An Examination of the Effects and
Regulation of Hydraulic Fracturing, 18 TEX. WESLEYAN L. REV. 129, 142 (2011).
114. Id.
115. Id. at 143.
116. Id.
117. Id. at 142.
118. See Barnett Shale Information, RAILROAD COMMISSION TEX., http://
www.rrc.state.tx.us/oil-gas/major-oil-gas-formations/barnett-shale-information/ (last visited
Feb. 16, 2017) [https://perma.cc/B5EX-4EJC].
119. See Jake Rutherford, Don’t “Frac” This Up: Denton’s Frac Ban and the
Appropriate State Legislative Response, 47 TEX. TECH L. REV. 843, 856 (2015).
120. See id.
121. See id.
122. See Denton Fracking Facts, FRACK FREE DENTON, http://frackfreedenton.com/
fracking-facts/ (last visited Feb. 16, 2017) [https://perma.cc/CC74-URKN].
123. See id.; see also Rutherford, supra note 119, at 856.
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citizens, students, and environmental activists formed Frack Free Denton, a
group whose goal was enacting a total ban on fracking in the city.124 On
August 4, 2014, the city passed a ban on fracking by a wide margin.125
Although Denton was not the first Texas municipality to consider a fracking
ban, the reaction of the powerful Texas Oil and Gas Association (TXOGA)
to the formation of Frack Free Denton and the publicity the group received
was swift: while the members of Frack Free Denton celebrated, TXOGA
filed its lawsuit in the local district court.126 A few months later, the state
legislature passed H.B. 40, a bill that expressly preempts local laws
regulating oil and gas activities.127
After signing H.B. 40 at a state house ceremony in Austin, Texas,
Governor Greg Abbott praised the new law, describing the bill as “so
incredibly important.”128 The purpose of the bill, according to Governor
Abbott, is to do the “profound job of protecting private property rights.”129
TXOGA said the same thing: Denton’s fracking ban unfairly prevented
private property owners from leasing their mineral rights to oil and gas
companies that wanted to drill or frack on their land.130 But H.B 40 goes
further. The bill, which is more expansive than the bills that followed it in
Oklahoma and North Carolina, provides that no municipality may “enact or
enforce an ordinance or other measure, or an amendment or revision
[thereof] that bans, limits, or otherwise regulates an oil and gas operation
within the boundaries or extraterritorial jurisdiction of the municipality or
political subdivision.”131
H.B. 40 does make an exception: municipalities may pass ordinances
touching on some aboveground activity, including “regulation[s] governing
fire and emergency response, traffic, lights, or noise, or imposing notice or
reasonable setback requirements” provided that such regulations are
“commercially reasonable.”132 “Commercially reasonable” means that any
such aboveground regulations cannot interfere with the ability of a
“reasonably prudent operator to fully, effectively, and economically exploit,
develop, produce, process, and transport oil and gas, as determined based
on the objective standard of a reasonably prudent operator and not on an
individualized assessment of an actual operator’s capacity to act.”133
124. See Rutherford, supra note 119, at 856.
125. See Maqbool, supra note 28.
126. See id.
127. See Max B. Baker, Denton Fracking Bill Sails Through Texas Senate, FORT WORTH
STAR-TELEGRAM (May 4, 2015), http://www.star-telegram.com/news/business/barnett-shale/
article20199849.html [https://perma.cc/XC5N-ZWKB].
128. Jim Malewitz, Curbing Local Control, Abbott Signs “Denton Fracking Bill,” TEX.
TRIB. (May 18, 2015), http://www.texastribune.org/2015/05/18/abbott-signs-dentonfracking-bill/ [https://perma.cc/LUS6-3Y3X].
129. Id.
130. See Wade Goodwyn, New Texas Law Makes Fracking Bans Illegal, NPR (May 20,
2015),
http://www.npr.org/2015/05/20/408156948/new-texas-law-makes-local-frackingbans-illegal [https://perma.cc/LUS6-3Y3X].
131. H.B. 40, 84th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Tex. 2015).
132. Id.
133. Id.
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H.B. 40 thus appears to condition even traditional municipal powers on
whether it makes fracking more expensive or difficult. H.B. 40 is an
unprecedented challenge to the status of Texas’s home rule cities because it
does not just tell the cities that they may not directly regulate oil and gas
(which they traditionally could do, provided those regulations were
consistent with state laws), but it also tells the cities that they may not enact
any law, even traffic ordinances or noise and light restrictions, that hampers
oil and gas operations.
Within weeks of the passage of H.B. 40, the Oklahoma legislature passed
S.B. 108.134 North Carolina followed a few months later.135 These state
laws are not the only way that local governments have been prevented from
regulating oil and gas directly—local bans and moratoria have also been
struck down by state courts as impliedly or conflict preempted by state
regulations.136 There are also some cities and towns that do not wish to
block fracking altogether but would like to exercise some control over
whether and how fracking takes place. Yet even these kinds of regulations
can be met with stiff resistance at the state level.137
II. STATE VERSUS LOCAL CONTROL OF FRACKING
Traditionally, states oversee large-scale regulation of the oil and gas
industry, with “large-scale” referring to well and intrastate pipeline siting.
Small-scale regulation, such as zoning that affects the placement of well
pads, the control of light and noise from drilling operations, and access and
storage of water, has historically been handled by local governments. This
reflects a longstanding approach of relegating matters of unique local
character, like the distance between a well pad and a school, to local
governments.
Each state has different state-local dynamics. Notably, there is less
deviation in the abilities of cities and towns to regulate the small-scale
aspects of fracking as there is in their abilities to enact blanket bans on
fracking. The extent to which cities may enact outright bans on fracking
depends, to some extent, on the degree of autonomy they have from the
state government. This is because, although nearly all cities in the United
States are home rule cities, what “home rule” means depends on how the
powers of cities and localities are created. Still, while understanding the
principle of home rule cities explains why states are now passing laws that
expressly prohibit local regulation of oil and gas, the solution proposed in
this Article applies to both home rule cities and other municipal bodies.

134. See S.B. 809, 55th Leg., 1st Sess. (Okla. 2015); H.B. 40, 84th Leg., Reg. Sess.
135. See S.B. 119, Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (N.C. 2015).
136. See supra note 20 and accompanying text.
137. See H.B. 1119, 70th Gen. Assemb., 1st Reg. Sess. (Colo. 2015); H.B. 1205, 2015
Leg., Reg. Sess. (Fla. 2015); S.B. 421, 52d Legis., 1st Sess. (N.M. 2015); H.B. 1299, 118th
Gen. Assemb., 2d Reg. Sess. (Ind. 2014); S.B. 245, 2013 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Kan. 2013).
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A. How States Control the Regulation of Fracking
There is rich scholarship surrounding the idea that at least some largescale control over fracking—typically, over where fracking may occur—is
best left to state governments.138 Those who argue for federal regulation
may be concerned that state and local governments are too likely to be
swayed by the oil and gas industry instead of recognizing that fracking is
particularly disruptive, not only to the surrounding ecosystem but to any
nearby human populations.
Despite the potential merits of a federal regulatory approach to oil and
gas activities, there are two major reasons why, for the foreseeable future,
this is probably not in the cards. First, Congress is much more divided on
the issue of oil and gas, and fracking in particular, than it was on coal
mining (which is subject to some federal oversight), especially now that
federal environmental regulations and state renewable portfolio standards
have pushed many electric utilities to switch to more natural gas-fired
power plants over coal.139 This has created a strong demand for natural
gas, which fracking produces in great quantities.
Second, the EPA has been moving toward cooperative federalism in its
regulatory models that put more and more direct authority in state hands
because, as a practical matter, the agency does not have the resources to
oversee all of the activities that fall within its regulatory purview.140 The
fracking boom in particular poses a very real budgetary challenge for the
EPA: the U.S. had over 1.7 million fracked wells in 2015.141 The EPA
simply cannot comprehensively monitor each and every well for regulatory
compliance.142 The same argument can be made against state regulation of
fracking, and in favor of local regulation of fracking, because state
environmental agencies are also often fighting strained budgets and a lack
of oversight.
In assessing what local governments can do to have a meaningful voice
in the environmental impacts of fracking, it is useful to think of two
particular areas where local police power might come into play:
environmental and zoning concerns. Local governments regulate both
environmental issues and zoning through their police power—i.e., their
power to regulate to protect the health, safety, and welfare of their citizens.
This Article is primarily concerned with how local governments may still

138. See, e.g., Fershee, supra note 14, at 61–74; Osofsky & Wiseman, supra note 11, at
778–79; Spence, supra note 1, at 376–84.
139. See Ben Wolfgang, Fracking Support Becomes Bipartisan and Both Parties See
Economic Benefits, WASH. TIMES (Apr. 7, 2017), http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/
2013/apr/7/fracking-support-becomes-bipartisan-as-both-partie/?page=all [https://perma.cc/
MP4A-CTFM].
140. See, e.g., John P. Dwyer, The Practice of Federalism Under the Clean Air Act, 54
MD. L. REV. 1183, 1190–209 (1995).
141. See Matt Kilso, 1.7 Million Wells in the U.S.—A 2015 Update, FRACTRACKER
ALLIANCE, http://www.fractracker.org/2015/08/1-7-million-wells/ (last visited Feb. 16,
2017) [https://perma.cc/5AQE-AW95].
142. See Dwyer, supra note 140, at 1190–92.
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exercise regulatory authority in ways that address citizens’ environmental
concerns regarding fracking operations.143
B. The Contours of State and Local Government Power
The contours of intrastate preemption—that is, when state law trumps
local law—are notoriously ill defined. While the U.S. Constitution makes
clear that federal law preempts state law, it is not as clear why and under
what circumstances state law should preempt local law.144 Part of the
problem is that the relationship between states and municipalities is not as
clearly hierarchical as the federal-state relationship. Is the state primary to
the city, or do the two have more or less concurrent powers, parallel but
rarely overlapping?145
Beginning in the late eighteenth century, it became popular to
characterize municipal governments as subordinate to their home states in
all matters. This idea—called “Dillon’s Rule”—is closely associated with
Judge John Forrest Dillon, a state and then federal judge who wrote an
influential treatise on municipal corporations after the Civil War.146 In an
1868 opinion, Judge Dillon famously stated, “Municipal corporations owe
their origin to, and derive their powers and rights wholly from, the
legislature. It breathes into them the breath of life, without which they
cannot exist. As it creates, so may it destroy. If it may destroy, it may
abridge and control.”147
Under Dillon’s Rule, the state’s power over local governments is near
absolute.148 This view holds that local governments may exercise only
powers expressly or impliedly granted by state legislatures and those
powers necessary to carry on local business.149 Because Dillon’s Rule does
not permit local governments to exercise any authority within the state’s

143. In a subsequent article, this author will address the possibility that local governments
maybe be able to address zoning concerns, including noise, light, setbacks, and other
traditional municipal regulations through private contract.
144. See Uma Outka, Intrastate Preemption in the Shifting Energy Sector, 86 U. COLO. L.
REV. 927, 943 (2015) (providing an in-depth analysis of state and local power sharing with
respect to renewable energy development).
145. See John R. Nolan & Steven E. Gavin, Hydrofracking: State Preemption, Local
Power, and Cooperative Governance, 63 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 995, 998–1000 (2013)
(discussing how state and local governments might interact to govern fracking given the
uncertain dynamic between them); see also Hannah J. Wiseman, Disaggregating Preemption
in Energy Law, 40 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 293, 317–22 (2016) (proposing a new procedural
approach to preemption questions that would first require identification of the area of
regulation and which level of government typically regulates in that area).
146. See Paul Diller, Intrastate Preemption, 87 B.U. L. REV. 1113, 1122–23 (2007).
147. City of Clinton v. Cedar Rapids & Mo. River R.R., 24 Iowa 455, 475 (1868). After
this case was decided, the Iowa legislature adhered to Dillon’s Rule and kept “a tight
legislative grip over municipal affairs through a combination of inaction and a jungle of code
provisions” until a home rule provision was added to the state constitution in 1968. See
Berent v. City of Iowa City, 738 N.W.2d 193, 196 (2007).
148. Diller, supra note 146, at 1123.
149. See id.
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police power, there is little chance of a preemption problem: cities and
towns simply cannot engage in substantive policymaking.150
Today, only a few states use Dillon’s Rule as the backbone of the statelocal relationship—although many more states use some version of the rule
for municipalities that do not meet the state requirements for home rule.151
Cities in these states still have only those legal powers affirmatively granted
to them by the states, which might explain why S.B. 180 seems more
permissive toward local lawmaking, specifically allowing municipalities to
regulate for the health and safety of residents—it has to be to allow any
lawmaking that might affect oil and gas operations to take place. Compare
this to H.B. 40, which specifically prohibits cities and towns from passing
any law that has an adverse commercial impact on oil and gas operations,
with a specific list of exceptions.152 As discussed below, Texas is a home
rule state, with cities that have much greater leeway in exercising their legal
authority.
However, even Dillon’s Rule acknowledged that municipalities do have
some inherent powers that inure to it by virtue of its recognition by the
state.153 According to Professor David Barron, these inherent powers were
“quasi-private corporate powers,” and Dillon himself explained that “[i]n
many of its more important aspects a modern American city is not so much
a miniature State as it is a business corporation,—its business being wisely
to administer the local affairs and economically to expend the revenues of
the incorporated community.”154 “Local affairs” has a long history of
including the municipal police power, which is the “earliest and strongest of
municipal powers.”155 This police power included “the protection of public
health and safety, the regulation of public order, and the requirement that
people comport themselves so as not to harm others or their property.”156
Although Dillon’s Rule did recognize a certain degree of inherent local
authority, the idea that cities and towns only had authority beyond their
municipal police power if the state expressly granted that authority was
150. See id. at 1123–24.
151. See id. at 1126 n.64. As Professor Diller notes, it is difficult to know how many
states actually use Dillon’s Rule because almost no states subscribe to the rule as Dillon
articulated it, nor do states use a uniform definition of “home rule.” See id. One of the states
with a prohibition on local fracking bans, Oklahoma, permits cities with populations of over
2,000 to adopt home rule by charter. OKLA. CONST. art. 18, § 3(a). Article 11 of the Texas
constitution allows cities with populations of over 5,000 to adopt home rule by charter. TEX.
CONST. art. 11, § 5. North Carolina does not really use either Dillon’s Rule or home rule; the
state legislature issues specific grants of power to municipalities à la Dillon’s Rule, but in
some cases those grants are more substantial than Dillon would have been comfortable with.
See David W. Owens, Local Government Authority to Implement Smart Growth Programs:
Dillon’s Rule, Legislative Reform and the Current State of Affairs in North Carolina, 35
WAKE FOREST L. REV. 671, 675–76 (2010).
152. See H.B. 40, 84th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Tex. 2015).
153. See David J. Barron, Reclaiming Home Rule, 116 HARV. L. REV. 2257, 2285 (2003).
154. Id. (alteration in original) (quoting JOHN F. DILLON, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAW OF
MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS § 15, at 34 (4th ed. 1890)).
155. Hugh Spitzer, “Home Rule” vs. “Dillon’s Rule” for Washington Cities, 38 SEATTLE
U. L. REV. 809, 825 (2015).
156. Id.

2017]

WHERE OIL IS KING

1655

challenged by contrary views, including the “Cooley Doctrine,” which
espoused the theory of an inherent right to local self-determination.157 This
doctrine is named for Michigan Supreme Court Judge Thomas M. Cooley,
who stated in an 1871 opinion that “local government is a matter of
absolute right; and the state cannot take it away.”158 The Cooley Doctrine,
among other historical influences,159 may have been a factor in the late
nineteenth-century development of the home rule city, which, for the
purposes of this Article, follows the definition laid out by Professor Paul
Diller: “[A] system of state and local relations that gives some degree of
permanent substantive lawmaking authority to localities beyond that which
was provided by the traditional Dillon’s Rule regime.”160
The move toward home rule cities has been described as an attempt to
increase the participation of citizens in the democratic process, although
this account has been challenged.161 According to Professor Barron, home
rule is often enshrined as a powerful argument in favor of local autonomy,
but the reality may be messier.162 Instead, home rule is one way that
legislatures can defer making politically difficult decisions in increasingly
complex metropolitan areas under the guise of promoting autonomy.163
As Professor Uma Outka has noted, another historical holdover in statemunicipal power structures is the fact that they develop in a reactionary
manner, meaning that local governments first begin governing and then
states stepped in afterward to define the limits of each locality’s
authority.164 How the state chooses to define those limits—whether by
state constitution, by statute, or in practice—is important as well because
defining local powers in the state constitution makes it considerably more
difficult for the state legislature to alter or abridge those powers.165 Most
U.S. cities today are home rule cities, with certain powers over inherently
local matters, but those powers are not unlimited.166
C. Home Rule Cities and Intrastate Preemption
Although the precise contours of their powers vary from state to state,
home rule cities generally have all powers except those the state has
expressly reserved for itself.167 Most states recognize that cities over a
157. See id.
158. Id. at 816.
159. See Barron, supra note 153, at 2277–82. Professor Barron specifically cites the
legacy of the Greek and Roman city-states (or at least the idea of those city-states) and
experiences in Britain before the Industrial Revolution. See id.
160. Diller, supra note 146, at 1124.
161. See id.
162. See Barron, supra note 153. Although Professor Barron’s article is primarily
concerned with home rule as frustrating antisprawl policies, his more cynical description of
home rule and its purposes provides an interesting counterpoint to the more traditional
understanding of home rule as promoting democracy at the local level.
163. See id. at 2269–70.
164. See Outka, supra note 144, at 943.
165. See id. at 943–44.
166. See Diller, supra note 146, at 1126–27.
167. See id. at 1124.
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certain population threshold are home rule cities, meaning (at least
theoretically) that they have “exclusive control over affairs peculiar to the
locale governed.”168 The development of home rule cities began in the
nineteenth century, as many states started delegating more day-to-day
control to cities, either by constitution or statute.169 There are conflicting
accounts of what propelled the movement toward home rule and what
policy goals that movement was intended to achieve, which helps explain
why the term means different things from state to state.170
The generally accepted view of home rule cities is that they may exercise
any power not expressly withheld from them by the state.171 This means
that even a home rule city’s minor ordinance can be expressly preempted by
state legislation if that legislation specifically overrides local regulations on
a certain subject matter. For example, states have passed legislation
preventing local governments from banning smoking, banning plastic bags,
raising the minimum wage, implementing rent control, and, most recently,
protecting LGBT groups through antidiscrimination measures.172
In many ways, the battle over fracking bans unfolding throughout the
country is just another verse of a familiar song: that of an industry
protesting to the state when cities and towns pass regulations that negatively
impact that industry.173 Although cities and towns can act as important
policy innovators that are often on the vanguard of legal reform, some local
ordinances may be met with strong resistance from impacted groups.174
When controversial local laws are passed, businesses or interest groups that
are impacted by those laws generally file preemption claims, arguing that
the city cannot pass a law that is inconsistent or otherwise in conflict with
state laws.175
With respect to fracking, concerns over the economic effects of local
fracking bans, moratoria, and regulation have prompted state action to
curtail municipal regulations that might frustrate oil and gas operations. In
Texas, for example, the state constitution enshrines home rule cities as
possessing local powers to the fullest extent possible. As the Supreme
Court of Texas has stated:

168. Jill Welch, Home Rule Doctrine and State Preemption—The Iowa Supreme Court
Resurrects Dillon’s Rule and Blurs the Line Between Implied Preemption and Inconsistency,
30 RUTGERS L.J. 1548, 1550 (1999).
169. See Diller, supra note 146, at 1124.
170. See Outka, supra note 144, at 944.
171. See Richard Briffault, Our Localism: Part I—The Structure of Local Government
Law, 90 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 85 (1990).
172. See Diller, supra note 146, at 1123–24, 1138 (noting that industry groups may find a
more “sympathetic reception” in state legislatures than in some cities, as the former tend to
be more politically conservative than the latter); see also Dave Phillips, North Carolina Bans
Local Anti-discrimination Policies, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 23, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/
2016/03/24/us/north-carolina-to-limit-bathroom-use-by-birth-gender.html?_r=0
[https://
perma.cc/PH5W-BB5J].
173. See Diller, supra note 146, at 1138.
174. See id. at 1117–19.
175. See id. at 1119–20.
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It was the purpose of the Home-Rule Amendment . . . to bestow upon
accepting cities and towns of more than 5,000 population full power of
self-government, that is, full authority to do anything the legislature could
theretofore have authorized them to do. The result is that now it is
necessary to look to the acts of the legislature not for grants of power to
such cities but only for limitations on their powers.176

Thus, “if the Legislature decides to preempt a subject matter normally
within a home-rule city’s broad powers, it must do so with ‘unmistakable
clarity.’”177
This is precisely what the state of Texas did when it passed H.B. 40,
forbidding cities and towns from enacting bans, moratoria, or most
regulations over oil and gas activities.178 But even where the state
legislature has not expressly forbidden a home rule city from regulating oil
and gas, state courts may still find that there is an unacceptable conflict
between state and local laws. The home rule city of Fort Collins, Colorado,
discovered this when its five-year moratorium on fracking—instated so that
the environmental effects of the technique could be better understood—was
struck down by the state supreme court for being in “operational conflict”
with state oil and gas regulations.179
The lesson here is that, despite their theoretically greater autonomy,
home rule cities are just as likely as their non-home rule counterparts to
have their ordinances struck down by state legislatures or courts. Although
scholars such as Professor Diller have suggested that courts should afford a
high deference to local ordinances unless they “clearly contravene the
purposes of state law,” the reality is that many courts seem to do just the
opposite by assuming that local ordinances must fall when allegedly
preempted by state law.180 While this Article suggests a solution that could
work in home rule or non-home rule cities, the reality is that state
legislatures and state courts have the power to preempt any local ordinance,
no matter how legally sound the underpinning of that ordinance might
be.181 What makes the solution in this Article more likely to survive is that
all local governments already have certain types of environmental
ordinances in place, and, as discussed in Part III, incorporation of a statelevel law should not be preempted, since it is furthering and not frustrating
the state regulatory scheme.

176. Forwood v. City of Taylor, 214 S.W.2d 282, 286 (Tex. 1948).
177. In re Sanchez, 81 S.W.3d 794, 796 (Tex. 2002) (quoting Dallas Merch.’s &
Concessionaire’s Ass’n v. City of Dallas, 852 S.W.2d 489, 491 (Tex. 1993)).
178. See H.B. 40, 84th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Tex. 2015).
179. See City of Fort Collins v. Colo. Oil & Gas Ass’n, 369 P.3d 586, 594 (Colo. 2016).
180. Diller, supra note 146, at 1173.
181. The problem of intrastate preemption is the subject of several excellent articles, but
as Professor Diller points out, no single sweeping approach to local ordinances would work
for all states, given the variance both between home rule and non-home rule jurisdictions and
between home rule jurisdictions that derive their power from state constitutions versus state
statutes. See id. at 1173–74.
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III. PRESERVING LOCAL POWER OVER THE ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACTS
OF FRACKING THROUGH ENFORCEMENT OF STATE LAW
One of the concerns for citizens in oil and gas producing states is that,
even though there may be laws on the books to protect air, water, land, and
other aspects that directly affect local environmental concerns, those states
do not adequately enforce the laws.182 This part will provide an overview
of the problem of inadequate enforcement in several states, including Texas,
and provide a possible solution: the local incorporation and enforcement of
state environmental laws. This solution can be employed by cities in every
state, not just those with active oil and gas operations. There are, however,
practical concerns that must be acknowledged.
It is important to reiterate that this Article argues for municipal
incorporation of general environmental laws touching upon air and water
quality standards, not on the incorporation of state oil and gas regulations.
The reason why this distinction is important is because states have
traditionally regulated oil and gas operations183 and state court decisions
and statutes prohibiting local oil and gas regulation apply (or purport to
apply) preemption to local laws that directly regulate those operations.
There is also the problem of cost. While incorporating state laws may not
cost a municipality much, enforcing them is another matter. Consequently,
larger and more affluent cities are more likely to be able to employ
inspectors, maintain documents, and pursue compliance efforts—although it
is also likely that local governments already have some type of licensing
and enforcement program in place to enforce existing local environmental
ordinances. Thus, this Article’s proposed solution may not be feasible for
some localities and may only be necessary when fracking operations cannot
be stopped by local veto or regulated directly by municipal law.
A. Enforcement Gaps: When State Environmental Laws
Are Strong on Paper but Weak in Application
If a state chooses to remove the power of municipalities to ban or
regulate oil and gas activities, the state makes itself the sole custodian of its
citizens’ health and safety vis-à-vis fracking and other extractive activities.
This proposition might not be of concern to local citizens if states were
stringent about enforcing environmental laws that protect air, water, and
182. See infra Part III.A; see also Dara O’Rourke & Gregg P. Macey, Community
Environmental Policing: Assessing New Strategies of Public Participation in Environmental
Regulation, 22 J. POL’Y ANALYSIS & MGMT. 383 (2003) (discussing how poor state
enforcement of environmental laws led to citizen groups, called “bucket brigades,” that
initiate their own enforcement efforts).
183. Before H.B. 40, however, Texas courts recognized local police power, permitting
local governments to regulate oil and gas operations to the extent that those regulations were
consistent with their police power. See Unger v. Texas, 629 S.W.2d 811, 812–13 (Tex. App.
1982) (“[M]unicipalities in Texas have, under the police power, authority to regulate the
drilling for and production of oil and gas within their corporate limits, when acting for the
protection of their citizens and the property within their limits, looking to the preservation of
good government, peace, and order therein.” (quoting Klepak v. Humble Oil & Ref. Co., 177
S.W.2d 215 (Tex. App. 1944))).
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soil, both inside and outside of the context of fracking, but budgetary
restraints have created enforcement gaps in many states.184 Thus, in some
areas, there is a double bind: fracking may not be banned, nor is there
sufficient state enforcement of environmental protections. Similarly, at the
federal level, the EPA budget has remained flat in recent years, and the
agency has been accused of having insufficient resources to oversee state
compliance with federal environmental laws.185 Because citizens have
more direct channels of communication to their municipal governments,
localities can respond directly to environmental issues, including issues
stemming from fracking operations or other extractive techniques, in a more
directed manner. To avoid preemption by state environmental laws,
however, localities may not wish to attempt enacting their own regulations.
Instead, they can incorporate existing state environmental laws and enforce
them locally.186
B. Local Enforcement of State Environmental Regulations
The incorporation of state environmental laws at the local level is one
way in which municipalities can exercise their police power to protect
citizens where they cannot directly regulate oil and gas. In fact,
incorporating state environmental laws protects local residents in many
contexts, not just where fracking is concerned. In a sense, this proposition
is simply strengthening the already multilevel nature of environmental laws:
these state laws already apply to local actors, but for reasons described
above, the state is not always in the best position to be aware of potential
violations or to enforce its own regulations.
184. See, e.g., Environmental Spending in the 50 States, BALLOTPEDIA, https://
ballotpedia.org/Environmental_spending_in_the_50_states (last visited Feb. 16, 2017)
(showing environmental budget changes across the states from 2011 to 2015, although these
numbers do not indicate on what programs the money is being spent) [https://
perma.cc/TV86-U8G6]; Andrew Kenney and Craig Jarvis, Cuts to DENR Regulators Jarring
in Wake of Dan River Spill, CHARLOTTE OBSERVER (Mar. 8, 2014, 3:16 PM), http://
www.charlotteobserver.com/news/local/article9102665.html (detailing the continuing budget
cuts and reorganization of the North Carolina Department of Environment and Natural
Resources, now the Department of Environmental Quality) [https://perma.cc/VRW4-EY8P];
Joe Wertz, State Impact: Why Continued State Funding Cuts Could Squeeze Programs
Protecting Public Water, NPR (Feb. 4, 2016, 2:39 PM), https://stateimpact.npr.org/
oklahoma/2016/02/04/why-continued-state-funding-cuts-could-squeeze-programsprotecting-public-water/ (noting that the Oklahoma Department of Environmental Quality’s
budget has declined nearly 30 percent from 2009 to 2016) [https://perma.cc/X7WF-ZQCY].
This same is true in Florida, where the legislature came very close to passing a ban on local
fracking vetoes. See, e.g., Jeff Burlew, More Than 1,100 State-Employee Positions Cut,
TALLAHASSEE DEMOCRAT (June 23, 2015), http://www.tallahassee.com/story/news/
2015/06/23/state-employee-positions-cut/29154335/ (detailing the impact of state budget
cuts on Florida’s Department of Environmental Protection) [https://perma.cc/8YAJ-TNAU].
185. See Joe Davidson, EPA’s Fall in Flint, an Aberration or Part of a Pattern?, WASH.
POST (Jan. 28, 2016), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/federal-eye/wp/2016/01/28/
epas-fall-in-flint-an-aberration-or-part-of-a-pattern/ (containing data showing that agency
inspection and enforcement has declined because there was little money leftover after
bureaucratic spending) [https://perma.cc/S9M6-SBFS].
186. This is something states have done many times by enacting statutes that implement
and enforce federal laws. See infra Part III.
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Further, a state argument that its own air and water protections preempt
local incorporation of those same protections would be discordant with the
fact that environmental regulation is already an area of cooperative
federalism. Congress has set minimum requirements for air and water
protections and requirements in the Clean Air Act (CAA) and the Clean
Water Act (CWA). Every state must have either created a State
Implementation Policy (SIP) to comply with the CAA and CWA, or it must
have enacted its own regulatory scheme that at least meets the federal
minimums set forth in the CAA and CWA.187 Thus, environmental
regulation is already the subject of both federal- and state-level decision
making.
This cooperative federalism model promotes a centralized national
environmental policy and seeks to ensure that all citizens have at least a
baseline level of protection from certain environmental harms.188 This
centralized approach is also desirable from an industry perspective because
it promotes regulatory uniformity, which industries doing business on the
national or state level prefer.189 The costs associated with complying with
differing state and national laws is something that larger industries actively
seek to avoid. As Professor Diller has explained, industries generally resist
local laws that are out of step with state and national laws—such as bans on
plastic bags, trans fats, or sugary drinks—by arguing that an inconsistent
patchwork of regulations is created by such local laws.190
Thus, allowing localities to incorporate and enforce state environmental
laws is consistent with the goals of centralized environmental regulations
because it avoids the costly patchwork of state and local regulations.191 It is
also possible that local residents can help with enforcement—the so-called
“bucket brigades” and other local environmental task forces—and perhaps
even strengthen otherwise weak state-level environmental law.192
However, even the incorporation of state laws—as opposed to unique local
ordinances—may be subject to a preemption challenge from the state or an
187. See Paul S. Weiland, Federal and State Preemption of Environmental Laws: A
Critical Analysis, 24 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 237, 256–57 (2000).
188. See id. at 255.
189. See Diller, supra note 146, at 1134 (noting that one of the reasons why industries
may oppose local regulation, even when it might benefit them, is their interest in regulatory
uniformity). This obviously was not true in BCCA Appeal Group v. City of Houston, 496
S.W.3d 1 (Tex. 2016), where it would seem that the industrial facility owners and operators
actually protested the enforcement of the state’s clean air and water laws by anyone, whether
it was the TCEQ or the City of Houston.
190. See Diller, supra note 146, at 1134; Nina A. Mendelson, Chevron and Preemption,
102 MICH. L. REV. 737, 765 (2004) (“[W]ell-organized interest groups, such as business
trade associations . . . are likely to strongly prefer uniform national rules.”).
191. However, it is true that some states have relatively weak environmental laws to
begin with, and thus enforcement by local governments may not accomplish much. In such
cases, “bucket brigades” might be a better option. See supra note 182 and accompanying
text.
192. See, e.g., O’Rourke & Macey, supra note 182, at 403–04. Some of these citizen
cleanup operations have, in fact, been in response to incidents at oil refineries. See id. at 392
(describing bucket brigade efforts to clean up after explosions and other incidents at
refineries in California and Louisiana).
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affected party. So, it must be possible to argue that local incorporation of
state law survives both implied and express preemption challenges and that
there are additional considerations that would support this option for cities
and towns. This Article makes the case that incorporating and enforcing
state environmental laws at the local level should survive such
challenges.193 Doing so, however, requires attention to a few doctrines that
have developed in the intrastate context.
1. Incorporating State Law to Ensure Consistent Enforcement
of Environmental Protections
The first step for a local government that wishes to ensure compliance
with state environmental laws or SIPs within its borders is to incorporate
those laws into its local ordinances, which can be accomplished by
reference.194 Incorporation by reference avoids potential preemption
challenges based on differing wording between the state and local
approaches.195 The next step would be to incorporate the rules of the state
environmental enforcement agency.196 These rules typically set out the
specific air and water quality requirements and the enforcement
mechanisms and thus are key to meaningful local participation in
monitoring and enforcing environmental compliance.197 Once the agency
rules have been incorporated, there are several options for local
governments, including contracting with the state environmental agency
and creating a parallel enforcement scheme.198
At this point, it should be noted that one city has incorporated state
environmental laws into its own code, and its experience is instructive.
Houston, Texas, has incorporated the Texas Clean Air Act (TCAA),
chapter 7 of the state water code, and rules of the Texas Commission on
Environmental Quality (TCEQ), “as they currently are and as they may be
changed from time to time,” into the health section of its code of
ordinances.199 Houston, the largest city in Texas and the fourth largest city
in the country, has long had serious air quality problems, partially due to its
proximity to industrial facilities, power plants, and refineries.200 Despite
193. Although, as noted in Part II, there is no way to guarantee that any local ordinance
will not be found preempted or overruled by state legislation.
194. See Weiland, supra note 187, 256–57.
195. See Diller, supra note 146, at 1142.
196. See, e.g., Wiseman, supra note 107, at 740–78 (referencing the power of state oil and
gas regulators, including the Texas Railroad Commission, in setting and enforcing laws).
197. See, e.g., City of Houston v. BCCA Appeal Grp., Inc., 485 S.W.3d 444, 448 (Tex.
App. 2013) (describing how the Texas Commission on Environmental Quality was created
to oversee and enforce state environmental laws), aff’d in part, rev’d in part, 496 S.W.3d 1
(Tex. 2016).
198. See id. at 449–50 (describing the options of Texas cities in enforcing state
environmental laws).
199. See HOUS., TEX., CODE OF ORDINANCES, ch. 21, art. VI, § 21-164 to -166 (2016); see
also TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. § 382 (West 1989).
200. In 2015, the American Lung Associated ranked Houston the sixth worst city in the
country for air pollution—an improvement from its rankings in previous years. See State of
the Air 2015: Most Polluted Cities, AM. LUNG ASS’N http://www.stateoftheair.org/2015/
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the existence of the TCAA, Houston consistently ranks among the worst
U.S. cities for air quality.201 In 1992, Houston enacted an air quality
ordinance that was intended to regulate emitters not covered by the
TCAA.202 Houston also contracted with the TCEQ to enforce emissions
standards in the city but chose to discontinue this relationship in 2005.203
In 2006 and 2007, the city amended its ordinance to incorporate the
provisions of the TCAA and water code “as if written word for
word . . . including appendices and other matters promulgated as part of the
state rules.”204 Further, the city incorporated those provisions “as they
currently are and as may be changed from time to time.”205 The city’s
health officers were directed to enforce the program and impose criminal
sanctions for violations.206
So, contracting with the state environmental agency is an option with
several advantages over creating a local enforcement program. Houston
pursued this route for over a decade until it decided that this arrangement
was not providing adequate enforcement.207 If a local government chooses
this route, it may not require incorporating any state laws or rules into the
local ordinances, although doing so does give the locality potentially more
enforcement options. This is because the type of contracting relationship
that Houston had with the TCEQ put inspection in the hands of the city and
enforcement in the hands of the agency.208 When this is the case, inaction
by the state agency could moot the locality’s efforts in inspecting emitters
and water resources, and, without any local power grant, there is nothing
the city or town could do about it.209
Still, a local government could choose to follow the contracting route,
with or without actually incorporating state law and rules, and the primary
advantage of doing so would be that preemption challenges to such an
arrangement are unlikely. Where the locality and state are working
city-rankings/most-polluted-cities.html (last visited Feb. 16, 2017) [https://perma.cc/5QC59T46]; see also Matthew Tresaugue, Houston’s Air Is Cleaner, but the Goalpost Is Moving,
HOUS. CHRON. (Oct. 12, 2014), http://www.houstonchronicle.com/news/scienceenvironment/article/Houston-s-air-is-cleaner-but-the-goal-post-is-5818359.php
[https://
perma.cc/BM54-HVC8].
201. See supra note 200; see also Jamie Smith Hopkins, In Texas, Environmental
Officials Align with Polluters, NAT’L GEOGRAPHIC (Mar. 17, 2015), http://
news.nationalgeographic.com/2015/03/20150317-ozone-air-pollution-clean-air-act-smogtexas-houston-dallas/ (noting that Texas has far and away the country’s highest levels of
nitrogen oxides and volatile organic compounds, both of which not only are greenhouse
gases but create smog and exacerbate asthma and other lung conditions in humans)
[https://perma.cc/DV8K-54GR].
202. BCCA Appeal Grp., 485 S.W.3d at 449.
203. Id. at 450.
204. Id. at 451 (quoting HOUS., TEX., CODE OF ORDINANCES ch. 21, art. VI, § 21-164(a)).
205. Id.
206. See id.
207. Id.
208. See id. (“Prior to 2007, the City contracted with TCEQ and cooperated with the
agency to ensure that sources of emissions located within the City’s borders were in
compliance with state law by inspecting and referring cases for enforcement action to the
TCEQ.”).
209. See O’Rourke & Macey, supra note 182.
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pursuant to an agreement to cooperate, and especially when there is no
additional local licensing and enforcement scheme, there is no basis for
arguing that the locality’s actions are preempted. However, as Houston’s
experience illustrates, taking this route is only effective if the state agency
is willing and able to pursue violators reported by the locality. If the
agency is not inclined to do so, the local government may be interested in
creating its own parallel enforcement scheme.210
As Houston’s experience shows, incorporating and enforcing state laws
can provoke preemption challenges. Although there is no way to guarantee
that any local ordinance will withstand an intrastate preemption challenge,
this Article proposes ways in which local governments can anticipate
preemption arguments and try to design incorporation and enforcement
schemes to counter those arguments.
2. Incorporating State Law: Express Preemption
Generally, express intrastate preemption requires that the state has
explicitly forbidden localities from legislating in a certain sphere. On the
surface, this sounds similar to the principle of independence and self-rule
for home rule cities: for an ordinance or other law passed by a home rule
city to be expressly preempted by state law, that state law must clearly and
unequivocally state that local governments may not regulate any of the
subject matter that the state law at issue covers.211 Even though this may
give the impression that express preemption is the only way to strike down
a home rule ordinance, this is not always the case, although at least one
state legislature (Illinois) and one state’s supreme court (Alaska) have made
clear that home rule city ordinances can be defeated only by express
preemption.212 This is very much the minority approach.
With respect to environmental regulation, this author was not able to find
any state laws that expressly prohibit local governments from regulating
environmental issues broadly. There are, however, examples of directives
in state environmental laws to the effect that local governments may not
regulate in a way that is inconsistent with state laws.213 This implicates
implied, as opposed to express, preemption, which is indeed the backbone
of intrastate preemption for both home rule and non-home rule
ordinances.214

210. BCCA Appeal Grp., 485 S.W.3d at 451.
211. See Diller, supra note 146, at 1124–25. Even express preemption is not a sure way
to strike down a local ordinance if the state constitution prevents it. See Outka, supra note
144, at 934 (providing Robinson Township v. Pennsylvania, 83 A.3d 901 (Pa. 2013), as an
example of a case in which a state’s express preemption of local laws failed).
212. See Diller, supra note 146, at 1156–59.
213. Indeed, this is true of the TCAA. See BCCA Appeal Grp., Inc. v. City of Houston,
496 S.W.3d 1, 1 (Tex. 2016).
214. See Diller, supra note 146, at 1140–42.
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3. Incorporating State Law:
The Arguments Against Implied Preemption
There are two kinds of implied preemption: conflict and field.215
Intrastate preemption tends to be of the conflict variety, and conflict
preemption is further subdivided into “physical impossibility” and
“obstacle” preemption.216 With respect to field preemption, state law could
impliedly preempt a local ordinance when the state has so thoroughly
regulated the subject matter—here, the environment—that there is nothing
left for the local government to regulate.217 While field preemption has
been used to stop local regulation of oil and gas, it would be a more
difficult argument in the environmental context given that local
governments already regulate environmental matters through building,
health, air, and water ordinances.
a. Conflict Preemption
Conflict preemption arises when it is either physically impossible to
comply with both the state and local laws on the same subject matter or
when the local law “stands as an obstacle to the accomplishment and
execution of the full purposes and objectives of Congress.”218 Many courts
that have found local ordinances to be preempted by state law have
employed an analysis closest to the latter category, obstacle preemption.219
Under this preemption analysis, the question should be whether the local
ordinance “substantially interferes with state law or the state’s
constitutional responsibilities.”220 This would be the appropriate inquiry,
particularly in the case of a home rule city, because preemption should be
applied to strike down local ordinances only in rare circumstances where a
genuine conflict with state law exists.
However, as Professor Diller points out, there are also many examples of
courts using a confusing and inconsistent version of the physical
impossibility test that he terms “prohibit/permit.”221 This prohibit/permit
approach “asks whether a local ordinance . . . ‘prohibits an act permitted by
statute.’”222 In essence, this test rests on the proposition that the state law
provides a regulatory baseline, and any activity above the baseline is
permitted. If the local ordinance attempts to punish any above-the-baseline

215. See id.
216. See id. at 1141.
217. See id. at 1153.
218. Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 67 (1941); see also Freightliner Corp. v. Myrick,
514 U.S. 280, 287 (1995); English v. Gen. Elec. Co., 496 U.S. 72, 78–79 (1990);
Hillsborough County v. Automated Med. Labs., Inc., 471 U.S. 707, 713 (1985).
219. See Diller, supra note 146, at 1141–42.
220. See id. at 1142.
221. See id.
222. Id. (quoting Goodwill v. Humboldt County, 575 N.W.2d 486, 493 (Iowa 1998)).
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activity, the argument goes, it should be struck down as preempted.223
Although this approach is directly counter to the authority of home rule
cities in particular and ignores the reality of uniquely local problems
generally, opponents of local action nonetheless frequently employ it with
success.224
Indeed, the Supreme Court of Texas used a version of the prohibit/permit
test to strike down the enforcement provisions of Houston’s incorporation
of the TCAA. Although the court of appeals had held that Houston’s
ordinances were not preempted, because they did not conflict with state
law, the state supreme court found otherwise in BCCA Appeal Group v.
City of Houston.225 According to the court, the incorporation of the TCAA
and the TCEQ rules were permissible.226 What was preempted was the
city’s additional licensing requirements and enforcement mechanism.227
The court reached this conclusion by looking to the TCAA and the state
water code, both of which expressly permitted local regulations not
inconsistent with the state law.228 In the court’s view, Houston’s ordinance
was inconsistent with state laws because the city imposed additional
licensing requirements for emitters and imposed possible criminal
sanctions, even where the TCEQ had determined that there was no
violation.229 This was Houston prohibiting what was permitted by state law
and was thus preempted.230 The same reasoning was used to strike down
the licensing requirement, even though failing to obtain a license was not so
much permitted by state law as simply not addressed.231
The BCCA Appeal Group decision is disturbing because it renders moot
the fact that the state law itself permits local regulation of air and water. If
a city cannot enforce requirements identical to those imposed by the state,
then what local regulations of air and water would survive the Texas court’s
analysis? Further, putting aside the court’s strained reading of Houston’s
ordinance (which actually appears to only permit criminal sanctions where
the TCEQ has determined that there is a violation in direct conflict the
court’s interpretation of allowing the city to impose criminal sanctions in

223. See id. at 1142–43 (citing cases). This test has been used to strike down local
smoking bans, rent control ordinances, full service gas stations, minimum wage increases,
billboard restrictions, LGBT protections, and more. Id.
224. See id. at 1142.
225. 496 S.W.3d 1 (Tex. 2016); see id. at 5.
226. There was no preemption challenge to the incorporation of the TCAA, the state’s
water code, or the TCEQ rules in and of themselves but rather to the city’s separate licensing
requirement and enforcement powers. See id. at 14.
227. See id. at 11.
228. Id. at 17–19.
229. See id.
230. See id. at 19.
231. See id. at 19–20. The court’s finding with respect to the registration requirement
was based on its assertion that, under the Houston ordinance, criminal fines could be
imposed for failing to obtain a license. See id. But see infra note 232 (noting that Justice
Jeffrey Boyd observed in his dissent that it is not clear that Houston’s ordinance imposed
criminal fines if the TCEQ found no violation of the TCAA).
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spite of the TCEQ’s finding of no violation),232 the court also seemed to
overlook the fact that creating a local enforcement scheme like Houston’s is
a way to effectuate a state law, not to frustrate it.
If a local government wishes to incorporate and enforce state law in a
way that is more likely to survive the kind of prohibit/permit analysis used
in BCCA Appeal Group, the locality should make very clear that additional
licensing requirements would come with the typical fines imposed for
failing to follow local licensing schemes. Also, additional criminal or civil
fines to be collected by the city should be explicitly dependent upon the
finding of a violation by the state environmental agency.
Adding cumulative penalties for violation of state law, as Houston did
through criminal sanctions on top of the TCEQ’s finding of a violation and
levying of a civil fine, only furthers the state’s interest in compliance with
its laws. Further, as the dissent in BCCA Appeal Group noted, if the court
can limit the interpretation and application of the city ordinance in a way
that is consistent with state law, it should do so in lieu of preempting the
ordinance.233 As BCCA Appeal Group shows, there is no way to fully
ensure that a local ordinance survives a preemption analysis because state
courts do not give city ordinances presumptive validity or much deference,
even when (as was true in BCCA Appeal Group) state precedent would
seem to require it.234 However, given the importance of protecting the
health of individuals, especially when fracking or other large-scale
extractive activities are taking place near homes and schools, a local
government could follow these recommendations in incorporating and
enforcing state laws and have a strong argument that doing so should
survive a conflict preemption analysis.
b. Field Preemption
The second type of implied preemption, field preemption, may be raised
when the state has either expressed an intent to occupy a given field of
regulation or when a regulatory scheme is so pervasive that there is nothing
left for local governments to regulate.235 It is difficult to argue persuasively
that a state has pervasively regulated the field when it is complying with
minimums set by the federal government in the CAA and CWA. Further,
as noted above, the CAA, the CWA, and many state SIPs acknowledge that
local authorities play a role in environmental regulation and enforcement.236

232. This was a primary reason for Justice Boyd’s dissent in BCCA Appeal Group. See id.
at 24–33 (Boyd, J., dissenting). Justice Boyd pointed out that the majority’s interpretation of
Houston’s ordinance as allowing the city to impose criminal sanctions even when the TCEQ
had found no violation was not consistent with the plain language of the ordinance. See id.
Further, Justice Boyd observed that the state law did not mandate that the TCEQ be the sole
source of remedies for violations of the TCAA and the water code, nor did the majority seem
to apply the presumption of validity afforded by past precedent to home rule cities. See id.
233. See id.
234. See id. at 26–28.
235. See Weiland, supra note 187, at 255.
236. See id. at 255–57.

2017]

WHERE OIL IS KING

1667

However, there is an additional reason states would probably not prevail
on a field preemption argument: states have not occupied the field of
environmental regulations. Consistent with their traditional police power,
local governments regularly pass ordinances on wastewater treatment and
removal, the use of specified toxic materials in building codes, the handling
of solid waste removal in the city or town limits, and more.237 Because
both states and local governments regularly make laws in the environmental
sphere, it would be difficult for a state to argue that it has preempted the
field of environmental protection.
C. Additional Policy Considerations Against Preempting
Local Environmental Laws
In addition to the arguments that local adoption of state environmental
laws should not be expressly or impliedly preempted, there are also several
policy and prudential reasons against states attempting to use the power of
preemption to block local adoption and enforcement of state laws.
Although some states have expressly forbidden local bans on fracking and
local regulation of the oil and gas industry, the solution this Article
advocates for does not deal with the direct regulation of the extractive
industry or its activities. Furthermore, as many critics of preemption have
pointed out, overuse of the doctrine by state legislatures could begin to
erode both the benefits of the federalism model and citizens’ confidence in
the democratic process, a likely result when voter attempts to address local
problems are repeatedly trumped by the state.
1. Local Adoption of State Laws Is Not Preempted
by State Bans on Local Oil and Gas Regulations
States have traditionally regulated oil and gas, in part, because all state
citizens have an interest in promoting a statewide industry that produces
profits that can be shared by all. By contrast, environmental laws can
address uniquely local concerns and have traditionally also been the subject
of local ordinances. While there are thus important distinctions between the
two types of regulation, one argument that should be addressed is whether
or not incorporation of state laws is a type of de facto local regulation of oil
and gas, something that is forbidden in several states.238
A local government’s decision to incorporate and enforce state
environmental laws is not a ban, limit, or other regulation on oil and gas
operations. Rather, it is a limit on air pollution from any source. To the
extent that an oil and gas operation might violate the requirements of the
local air regulations, the result would not be a limitation on those operations
but rather—at most—the requirement to obtain a license and paying fines in
237. See, e.g., OKLA. CITY, OKLA., CODE OF ORDINANCES chs. 4, 12, 16, 27, 47, 49 (2016)
(regulating air pollution, building codes, drainage and flood control, litter, sewers and
sewage control, and solid wastes).
238. See City of Houston v. BCCA Appeal Grp., Inc., 485 S.W.3d 444, 458 (Tex. App.
2013), aff’d in part, rev’d in part, 496 S.W.3d 1 (Tex. 2016).
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the event of air or water pollution in violation of state law. Moreover, the
local incorporation of an existing state law does not impose substantial
additional costs, in and of itself, on the energy industry. Indeed, oil and gas
companies conducting extractive activities should have already factored in
the cost of compliance with state environmental laws. Given the enormous
costs associated with oil and gas activities, and fracking in particular, it is
difficult to believe that the cost of the license and—in the case of a
violation—a fine would make fracking commercially unreasonable.
However, even if a court were sympathetic to this argument, localities
can include severability clauses in their incorporation of state laws, which
would allow the court to strike down any additional licenses or fees
imposed by the local ordinance while letting the rest of the ordinance stand.
The city could then reconsider how to enforce its pollution limits in
different ways that would not necessarily impose an additional financial
burden on oil and gas operations.
2. Unlike Most Oil and Gas Regulation,
Environmental Protection Is Within Local Police Power
A recurring theme in the literature on the power of local governments is
the inconsistent treatment of those governments by state legislatures across
the United States.239 Whether cities have been designated home rule by
constitutional provision, statute, or simply through practice can change the
understanding of what localities may do without state permission. Yet even
before the competing visions of local authority under Dillon’s Rule and
home rule emerged in the United States, there was the older idea of the
local police power. Local police power has long been understood to extend
to the protection of the health and welfare of residents.240 As noted above,
the traditional powers of local governments over environmental issues by
way of air pollution control, wastewater disposal, and building materials
stem from this traditional notion of what cities and towns may regulate.
Indeed, the U.S. Supreme Court has held that local regulations over air
pollution fall squarely within the local police power. In Huron Portland
Cement Co. v. City of Detroit,241 the Court considered whether federal law
preempted a local smoke abatement ordinance enacted by Detroit,
Michigan.242 The appellant, a vessel owner, brought suit after the city fined
the appellant for violating the smoke ordinance when its vessels were
docked at the city port for long periods of time.243 The state courts found
for Detroit.244 The Court granted certiorari, and the appellant argued that
the Detroit ordinance did not apply to its vessels because (1) the vessels
had already passed a comprehensive licensing and inspection scheme
239. See generally Diller, supra note 146; Outka, supra note 144; Spence, supra note 1;
Wiseman, supra note 145.
240. See, e.g., Huron Portland Cement Co. v. City of Detroit, 362 U.S. 440 (1960).
241. 362 U.S. 440 (1960).
242. See id. at 441–42.
243. See id. at 441.
244. Id.
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enacted by Congress, and the Detroit ordinance was expressly or conflict
preempted by those federal requirements and (2) even if there was no
express preemption, the Detroit ordinance was impliedly preempted by the
Commerce Clause.245
The Court began its analysis by noting that Detroit’s “ordinance was
enacted for the manifest purpose of promoting the health and welfare of the
city’s inhabitants. Legislation designed to free from pollution the very air
that people breathe clearly falls within the exercise of even the most
traditional concept of what is compendiously known as the police
power.”246 The Court then proceeded to reject both of the appellant’s
arguments.247 With respect to the scope of Detroit’s lawmaking power, the
Court noted that “[t]he basic limitations upon local legislative power in this
area are clear enough. The controlling principles have been reiterated over
the years in a host of this Court’s decisions. Evenhanded local regulation to
effectuate a legitimate local public interest is valid unless pre-empted by
federal action.”248
First, the Court held that the smoke ordinance was not expressly or
impliedly preempted by the federal vessel inspection and licensing scheme
because the purpose of the federal and state laws at issue were not mutually
exclusive: the purpose of the federal scheme was “to insure the seagoing
safety of vessels subject to inspection,”249 while the purpose of the Detroit
smoke ordinance was “elimination of air pollution to protect the health and
enhance the cleanliness of the local community.”250 Next, the Court
recognized that Congress itself had expressly recognized the importance of
state and local governance in protecting public health in the text of the
CAA: “it is hereby declared to be the policy of Congress to preserve and
protect the primary responsibilities and rights of the States and local
governments in controlling air pollution.”251
Thus, because the federal and state regimes did not overlap and provide
conflicting or opposed directives, there was no express or conflict
preemption based on the federal vessel inspection and licensing scheme.252
Indeed, although the Court did not articulate this as such, its emphasis on
the important role that state and local governments play in regulating
pollution also suggests that there could be no field preemption in this realm,
even if the appellants had made such an argument.253 With respect to the
suggestion that the very existence of a federal licensing scheme precluded
the exercise of any local law on vessels that had complied with the federal
requirements, the Court was equally unconvinced, holding that the
possession of a federal license “does not immunize a ship from the
245.
246.
247.
248.
249.
250.
251.
252.
253.

See id.
Id. at 442.
See id. at 442–46.
Id. at 443 (citations omitted).
Id. at 445.
Id.
Id.
See id. at 446.
See id.
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operation of the normal incidents of local police power.”254 Finally, the
Court noted that the smoke ordinance did not offend the Commerce Clause,
because it applied to “‘any person, firm or corporation’ within the city” and
thus did not discriminate against interstate commerce.255
The Court’s opinion in Huron Portland Cement set out important
principles with respect to local police power. In particular, the Court
acknowledged the primary authority of state and local governments in
protecting the health, safety, and welfare of its citizens. This does not mean
that the federal government has no authority to regulate in the
environmental realm, but it does suggest that the authority to do so is shared
rather than exclusive: federal, state, and municipal authorities all have a
role to play in ensuring that the air, water, and soil that people are
surrounded by does not pose a danger to people’s health.
While it is true that Huron Portland Cement did not offer any specific
guidance as to the balance of power when both a state and its municipalities
seek to govern in the same space, the reality is that local governments
already regulate extensively in the environmental context through the
enactment of building codes—air, noise, and light pollution limits; storm
and wastewater regulations; and more. Thus, should a city’s or town’s
residents believe that steps must be taken to protect the environment
because the state is not enforcing its own laws, the decision to incorporate
those state laws and to enforce them locally should properly be seen as a
legitimate exercise of concurrent state and local police power.
3. Preventing the Adoption of State Laws by Local Governments
Through Preemption Erodes the Democratic Process
States that have already overruled the votes of local citizens by passing
laws that preempt local bans on fracking should be wary of trying to block
local incorporation of state environmental laws. Arguably, state preemption
of local fracking vetoes is a legitimate use of the doctrine, since the
development of the oil and gas industry is an issue with statewide economic
implications that could be undermined by municipal action. However, the
overuse of state preemption to overrule local authority undermines citizens’
faith in the democratic process. How can people believe their voices are
being heard when industries may use their political influence to override
any local law that negatively impacts them?256 These arguments have been
developed in federalism literature, but they apply perhaps even more
254. See id. at 447.
255. See id. at 448.
256. This has been written about more extensively in the federal-state preemption context.
See, e.g., Adam B. Cox, Expressivism in Federalism:
A New Defense of the
Anti-commandeering Rule, 33 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 1309 (2000) (arguing that state dignity may
be reason for the rule against commandeering); Roderick M. Hills, Jr., Against Preemption:
How Federalism Can Improve the National Legislative Process, 82 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1 (2007);
Mendelson, supra note 190; Ernest A. Young, Two Cheers for Process Federalism, 46
VILL. L. REV. 1349 (2001) (arguing that federal preemption threatens the core regulatory
authority of state governments, compromising their ability to win the popular loyalty
necessary to make political safeguards work).
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acutely in the context of state preemption of local laws, as citizens may be
more aware and invested in local—as opposed to state—matters.257
As Professor Ernest Young has pointed out, the role played by states in
electing the national government is an important political check on the
power of that government, but it is arguably not as powerful a check as the
“sentiments of the people.”258 In Professor Young’s view, the real political
check on national power by the states involves two prongs: first, a process
by which states can actually have an impact on national lawmaking and
second, a guarantee that national actors can be held accountable for their
actions after the laws are made.259 The latter idea—accountability—is
particularly relevant for this Article. The reason why a local government
might want to incorporate state environmental laws is because, despite the
existence of a process (local election of state officials) that ensures a local
voice in the state legislature, there is no satisfactory way to hold state actors
accountable for enforcing the laws they have passed. Local incorporation
allows for local enforcement, which is one way to guarantee that
commercial actors will comply with the requirements set out by state laws.
If, however, states were to use preemption as an argument for preventing
local incorporation of state laws, especially when the state itself has failed
to enforce those laws, citizen confidence in the political process would be
eroded. As Professor Roderick Hills has pointed out, industry interest
groups, whose constituents have an interest in shaping favorable policies,
frequently push federal regulation that preempts state law.260 The use of
federal preemption thus puts a stop to the state “laboratory,” where new
ideas, policies, and regulatory schemes may be experimented with to meet
Further, federal
evolving challenges posed by those industries.261
preemption of state law often fails to account for the fact that states—often
certain states in particular—are the entities that feel the impact of the
negative externalities produced by these same industries.262
This is particularly true for fracking. Only cities and towns located on
shale plays actually see fracking activity within their borders; other
municipalities in the same state may benefit economically from the
development of oil and gas wells in those areas, but they will not
experience the same negative environmental impact. Thus, while it may be
more defensible to utilize state preemption with respect to local oil and gas
257. See supra note 256.
258. See Young, supra note 256, at 1355–56 (discussing the emphasis that James
Madison places on popular opinion as a political check in The Federalist Papers). Professor
Young points out that Madison did not believe that the division of power between the federal
and state governments was as important as the will of the people. Id. at 1356 (“[T]he event in
every case, should be supposed to depend on the sentiments and sanction of their common
constituents.” (quoting THE FEDERALIST NO. 46, at 315 (James Madison) (J.E. Cooke ed.,
1977))).
259. See id. at 1357.
260. Hills, supra note 256, at 28.
261. See id. at 25.
262. See id. at 26–27. Hills makes an efficiency-based argument that Congress should
consider the comparative state and national costs of federal regulation when deciding where
regulatory authority over a particular subject matter should rest. See id. at 29–32.
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regulations, the same cannot be said for environmental regulations,
especially in municipalities where fracking is actually taking place. If states
were to attempt to preempt local incorporation of state environmental laws
in such municipalities, it would likely be without real accounting for the
disproportionate negative impact that fracking has on those municipalities.
In addition to being arguably inefficient, state preemption in this context
overrules the will of local citizens and erodes the political check on state
control of what are essentially local matters.
CONCLUSION
Local problems require local solutions. In states where direct local
regulation of oil and gas activities has been prohibited by the state in an
attempt to stop bans on fracking and other carbon projects, cities and towns
should seek alternative ways to take action. It has long been within the
police power of municipalities to protect the health, safety, and welfare of
their citizens, particularly when there are uniquely local activities at issue
that may have a disproportionately negative impact on the people living
close to those activities. As an extension of this police power, municipal
governments can consider incorporating state environmental laws to ensure
that those laws are being enforced vis-à-vis individuals and companies
operating within those local borders. Doing this should not be preempted
by state bans on local regulation of oil and gas, because the regulation does
not apply directly to extractive operations. Further, because the local
governments are simply enforcing existing state law, there should be no
issue of preemption by those state laws, either express or implied.

